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CORPORATE SPEECH & THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: HISTORY, DATA, AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
John C. Coates IV∗ 
This Article draws on empirical analysis of court decisions, 
history, and economic theory (a) to show that corporations have 
begun to displace individuals as the direct beneficiaries of the 
First Amendment, a shift from individual to business First 
Amendment cases is recent but accelerating, and (b) to outline an 
argument that such cases typically reflect a form of socially 
wasteful rent seeking—not only bad law and bad politics, but also 
increasingly bad for business and society. Basic facts about 
corporations in history are reviewed, regulation of commercial 
speech in U.S. history is summarized, and the emergence of the 
First Amendment in case law is retold, with an emphasis on the 
role of constitutional entrepreneur Justice Lewis Powell 
prompting the Supreme Court to invent corporate speech rights. 
The chronology shows that First Amendment doctrine long post-
dated pervasive regulation of commercial speech, which long pre-
dated the rise of the U.S. as the world’s leading economic power—
a chronology with implications for originalists, and for policy 
analysis of the value of commercial speech rights. The Article 
then analyzes Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals decisions to 
quantify what others1 have noted qualitatively: corporations have 
 
 ∗ John F. Cogan Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School. Thanks 
for helpful discussions—but no blame for the contents of this paper—should go to John 
Bonifaz, Ben Clements, Jeff Clements, Clarke Cooper, Ron Fein, Jill Hasday, Vicki 
Jackson, Geoff Stone, Ava Scheibler, Leo Strine, Mark Tushnet, and to participants at the 
legal symposium on “Advancing a New Jurisprudence for American Self-Government and 
Democracy, co-sponsored by Harvard Law School and Free Speech For People on Nov. 7, 
2014, and at a “Last Lecture” at Harvard Law School on February 11, 2015. Any errors are 
mine. For disclosure of financial interests potentially relevant to this Article, see Faculty 
Disclosures re: Related Outside Interests and Activities, HARV. L. SCH. [http://perma.cc
/TTH6-LNFE]. 
 1. See, e.g., Thomas Jackson & John Jefferies, Commercial Speech: Economic Due 
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979); Frederick Schauer, First 
Amendment Opportunism, in LEE C. BOLLINGER & GEOFFREY R. STONE, EDS., 
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 174–97 (2002); TAMARA 
COATES_FINAL DRAFT III (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2015 10:50 AM 
224 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:223 
 
increasingly displaced individuals as direct beneficiaries of First 
Amendment rights, they have done so recently, but with growing 
speed since Virginia Pharmacy (1976),2 Bellotti (1978),3 and 
Central Hudson (1980).4 Nearly half of First Amendment legal 
challenges now benefit business corporations and trade groups, 
rather than other kinds of organizations or individuals. Such cases 
represent examples of a particular kind of corruption, defined 
here as a form of rent seeking: the use of legal tools by business 
managers in specific cases to entrench reregulation in their 
personal interests at the expense of shareholders, consumers, and 
employees, and in aggregate to degrade the rule of law by 
rendering law less predictable, general and clear. This corruption 
not only risks the loss of a republican form of government 
emphasized by most critics of Citizens United, but also risks 
economic harms – a package of risks one could call (with some 
but only some exaggeration) “the risk of Russia.” 
I. SOME HISTORY 
In this Part, I review basic historical facts at the intersection 
of constitutional, business, and corporate law. Nothing in this 
section is news – except that business and corporate scholars may 
not be aware of the details of the constitutional history, and 
constitutional scholars may not be aware of the details of the 
business and corporate legal history. This Part of the Article thus 
represents an effort at improving dialogue across the sub-
disciplinary divide between corporate, business and constitutional 
scholars. Knowledge about each sub-discipline is increasingly 
necessary to understand the background for, and context and 
 
PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 
(2013); Tim Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation: How Corporations Hijacked the First 
Amendment, THE NATION (June 3, 2013), available at http://tinyurl.com/mpggrf7. 
 2. 425 U.S. 748. 
 3. 435 U.S. 765. 
 4. 447 U.S. 557. 
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implications of, recent, controversial decisions such as Citizens 
United5 and Hobby Lobby.6 
The key points of the three sections are (a) from the 
inception of the U.S., corporations were crucial to economic 
growth and were not merely constituted but heavily regulated by 
law, prominently through structural laws constraining their 
activities, (b) commercial speech has been regulated throughout 
U.S. legal history, both at common law and over time through 
statutes and regulations that largely reflect the purposes of the 
common law, and (c) the First Amendment has only recently been 
used by courts to strike down laws, and even more recently to 
strike down laws constraining commercial speech. In 
combination, these points should (1) lead committed originalists 
to reject First Amendment rights for corporate speech, (2) make 
courts (whatever their interpretive approach) reluctant to find 
such rights unless tightly linked to rights of specific individuals 
that cannot otherwise be protected and whose expressive (not 
financial) interests are represented by a legal entity, and (3) 
reduce the policy appeal of such rights, because they were not 
necessary to create the massive economic growth that turned a 
marginal set of colonies into the world’s leading economic power 
by 1900. 
A. A CAPSULE HISTORY OF THE ROLE OF CORPORATIONS IN 
BUSINESS HISTORY 
I begin by reviewing the role of corporations in U.S. business 
history. This review is broad in scope and summary in form, meant 
to put in context more focused (but useful) historical accounts by 
others, such as (for example) research on the question of how the 
“Founding Fathers” might have thought about whether business 
corporations should have First Amendment rights distinct from 
those held by the individuals acting through or on behalf of the 
 
 5. 558 U.S. 466 (2010). For an empirical analysis of the consequences of Citizens 
United, see John C. Coates, Corporate Politics, Governance and Value Before and After 
Citizens United, 9 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 657 (2012). For a trenchant legal critique co-
authored by the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, see Leo E. Strine, Jr. & 
Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course? The Tension Between Conservative 
Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 101 (2015). For 
additional commentary, see ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014); Geoffrey R. Stone, Citizens United and 
Conservative Judicial Activism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 485, 497 (“[A]ny Justice attempting 
seriously to employ an originalist analysis in Citizens United would also have had to uphold 
the legislation.”). 
 6. __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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corporations, or how the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment 
might have thought about the problem given the historical events 
of the second half of the nineteenth century.7 The main take-away 
is that businesses have long and pervasively been creatures of law 
and regulation, both in the United Kingdom leading up to the 
founding era, and in the U.S. corporations—in their creation, 
governance and activities—have from the outset of modern 
history been structured and regulated by law. This enmeshment 
of businesses in law was so intrusive and intense that—had it 
carried over to individuals—it would have been viewed as 
intolerable. Yet it was not merely tolerated, but taken for granted, 
even celebrated, for more than two centuries of Anglo-American 
history. 
As recounted in detail by Mary Bilder, among others, 
corporations from their inception in English (and hence, 
American) history were extensions of government—a “particular 
type of delegated jurisdiction within the ‘King’s exclusive 
prerogative.’”8 Typically, the sovereign granted what would then 
have been understood as royal franchises, powers or property to 
a subset of citizens, and the “corporation” of those citizens held 
authority from the sovereign over the domain specified in the 
corporate charter or equivalent documents. In English law, the 
term “corporate” used in a modern sense to refer to a legal entity 
can be traced to 1410,9 and commentary on corporations’ legal 
powers dates to the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth 
centuries, a time when incorporations were increasing.10 
 
 7. See, e.g., Leo F. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original: The 
Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); see also John C. Coates IV, State Takeover Statutes and 
Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806 (1989); Ruth H. 
Bloch & Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Corporations and the Fourteenth Amendment (2014), 
http://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Faculty/Lamoreaux/corporations-
14th.pdf.  
 8. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 
502–10 (2006) (quoting Janet McLean, The Transnational Corporation in History: Lessons 
for Today?, 79 IND. L.J. 363, 364 (2004)). 
 9. Id. at 516 n.58 (citing Y.B. 11 Hen. IV, fol. 47a, Hil., pl. 21 (1410) (Seipp No. 
1410.021) (“un University fuit corporate”)), reprinted in J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, 
SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY: PRIVATE LAW TO 1750, at 613 (1986).  
 10. Id. (citing ROBERT BROOKE, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT 188–92 (1573); id. 
at 517 n.61 (citing A Discourse of Corporations (c. 1587-1589), in 3 TUDOR ECONOMIC 
DOCUMENTS 273 (R.H. Tawney & Eileen Power eds., 1924); id. at 513, n.39 (citing 1 
EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 250 
(Garland 1979) (1628); WILLIAM SHEPHEARD, OF CORPORATIONS, FRATERNITIES, AND 
GUILDS 1–2 (London, H. Twyford, T. Dring & J. Plate 1659). On the numbers and nature 
of corporations through English history, see RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH 
LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 1720-1844 (2000). 
COATES_FINAL DRAFT III (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2015 10:50 AM 
2015] CORPORATE SPEECH 227 
 
Among these early corporations11 were the overseas trading 
companies, such as the East India Company.12 These trading 
companies functioned as recognizably (early) modern for-profit 
business enterprises—with dispersed private ownership, internal 
and external struggles for corporate and market control, and even 
hostile takeovers and mergers. 13 However, they also functioned 
as extensions of the military and political power of the English 
government, comprising part of the emerging English naval 
power and extending English control to India, the East Indies and 
North America. England’s trading companies “did not pursue 
‘peaceful trading’ because they believed that neither Portuguese 
[the rivals of the English] nor Asian rulers would allow them to 
do so without arms,” such that the “use of force remained an 
integral part of the commercial presence in Asia” of business 
corporations throughout the early modern period.14 
The East India Company also played an important role in 
public finance, lending money to the Stuarts (with James II 
becoming a shareholder), before managing to survive the 
Glorious Revolution to compete with the newly formed Bank of 
England and the ill-fated South Sea Company in providing fiscal 
support to the new Orange monarchy, recruited from the 
Netherlands to provide England’s new line of (if you will) chief 
executive officers.15 Nascent political parties formed on the 
shareholder bases of rival trading firms, and law, politics and 
business were intertwined in numerous detailed ways.16 Over 
time, the Bank of England came to play the dominant role in 
British public finance, and was structurally barred from engaging 
in non-financial activities, such as trade, or, as the industrial 
revolution progressed, manufacturing. 
 
 11. For an overview of types of early corporations, see, for example, 1 HENRY 
ALWORTH MEREWETHER & ARCHIBALD JOHN STEPHENS, THE HISTORY OF THE 
BOROUGHS AND MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM xxviii–xxix, xxxi 
(1835). 
 12. The best overall treatment of these earlier companies remains WILLIAM ROBERT 
SCOTT, THE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JOINT-STOCK SYSTEM TO 1720 
(Thoemmes 1993) (1910). 
 13. JOHN KEAY, THE HONOURABLE COMPANY: A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH EAST 
INDIA COMPANY (1991); K.N. CHAUDHURI, TRADE AND CIVILIZATION IN THE INDIAN 
OCEAN: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY FROM THE RISE OF ISLAM TO 1750 (1985); Dan Bogart, 
There Can Be No Partnership with the King: Regulatory Commitment and the Tortured Rise 
of England’s East Indian Merchant Empire (Nat’l Bur. Econ. Research, Working Paper, 
2015), available at http://eml.berkeley.edu/~webfac/seminars/bogart_211seminar.pdf. 
 14. Chaudhuri, supra note 13. 
 15. Keay, supra note 13. 
 16. BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS, CITY OF CAPITAL: POLITICS AND MARKETS IN THE 
ENGLISH FINANCIAL REVOLUTION (1996). 
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Throughout this period, charters were granted for temporary 
durations, insuring the ability of the sovereign to renegotiate their 
terms and impose new conditions (and extract money) as the 
terms approached. The Bubble Act of 1720 statutorily 
monopolized the creation of liquid business companies, by 
forbidding the sale of stock without a charter. Joint stock 
companies played a significant role in manufacturing as early as 
the mid-eighteenth century, as public stock markets began to 
build on the basis of what were effectively sovereign bond 
markets used by the English to facilitate the finance of their wars 
with France, undergirded by what John Brewer famously called 
its “sinews of power”—the successful British switch from 
privately managed tax farming (essentially a form of highly 
inefficient privatized tax collection) to much more effective and 
efficient publicly administered consumption taxes (equivalent to 
modern state and local sales taxes).17 That the American 
Revolution was fueled by resentment over taxes levied on and 
through “corporate” colonies,18 that the Declaration of 
Independence includes as one of King George’s acts of tyranny 
the fact of mercantilist trade regulation, much of it designed to 
protect the English trading companies,19 and that the Boston Tea 
Party was aimed at and prompted by laws designed to improve the 
financing of the East India Company,20 all reinforce the point that 
law was viewed as a crucial tool for constraining corporations in 
the period leading up to the adoption of the U.S. Constitution. 
Upon the formation of the U.S., one of the first major 
political battles was over another mixed public/private business 
corporation—the First Bank of the United States.21 Designed by 
Alexander Hamilton to enhance the power of the U.S. Treasury, 
the occasion of the first (wildly oversubscribed) initial public 
offering in U.S. history, the First Bank became the focus of attacks 
by Democrats as beyond the power of the Federal government to 
 
 17. JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY AND THE ENGLISH 
STATE, 1688-1783 (1988). 
 18. On the use of the corporate form to constitute the American colonies, and their 
connections to the key players in trading companies, see, for example, Mary Sarah Bilder, 
English Settlement and Local Governance, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN 
AMERICA (Christopher L. Tomlins & Michael Grossberg eds., 2007); ROBERT ASHTON, 
THE CITY AND THE COURT, 1603-1643 (1979); and ROBERT BRENNER, MERCHANTS AND 
REVOLUTION: COMMERCIAL CHANGE, POLITICAL CONFLICT, AND LONDON’S 
OVERSEAS TRADERS, 1550-1653, at 92–112 (1993).  
 19. The Declaration lists “the cutting off our trade with all parts of the world.”  
 20. BENJAMIN W. LABAREE, THE BOSTON TEA PARTY (1964). 
 21. BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION 
TO THE CIVIL WAR (1957). 
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create, before having its charter lapse in 1811.22 The many state 
banks and insurance companies that were set up in part as rivals 
to the First Bank were limited by the terms of their charters from 
leveraging their central roles in finance into dominant roles in 
other sectors. Justice Scalia’s statement in Citizens United that 
there were “hundreds” of corporations in existence at the 
founding is correct but a red herring: corporations in that era were 
not rare, but they were heavily intertwined with government, and 
as a result, just as mistrusted as government itself was mistrusted. 
The closeness of corporations and government in the eyes of 
the “Founding Fathers,” and the distance between their rights and 
those of the individuals acting through or on behalf of 
corporations, was well captured by Justice Marshall, in the first 
(1819) and still among the most famous statements of the legal 
theory of the corporation in U.S. legal history: 
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and 
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of 
law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its 
creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its 
very existence.23 
The fact that corporations could only act in ways and to 
pursue ends authorized in their charters means that—until late in 
the nineteenth century, when “general purpose” clauses became 
common in corporate charters—none of the corporations in 
existence at the time the First Amendment was adopted was 
legally authorized to engage in speech as a business activity, 
particularly political speech. Newspapers—which if organized as 
corporations would have been so authorized—by virtue of their 
very purpose, were not organized as corporations.24 In short, 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (Marshall, 
C.J.). As noted in Strine and Walter, “[This] holding is consistent both with contemporary 
practice and the descriptions of the corporation by [corporate treatise writers] Coke, 
Blackstone, and Kyd, [and] ... was reaffirmed scores of times before the Civil War.” Supra 
note 7 and text accompanying note 180 (discussing the phrase “existing only in 
contemplation of law”). Strikingly, the case is nowhere cited in the majority opinion in 
Citizens United, or in Justice Scalia’s concurrence. The “artificial entity” theory has been 
generally contrasted with two rival theories, the “aggregate” theory, which attempts to 
treat a corporation as “merely” the aggregate of the individuals who create it (typically, 
for such theorists, shareholders) and the “natural entity” theory, which treats corporations 
as if they were individuals for legal purposes. See Coates, supra note 7, at 809–25 (reviewing 
theories of the corporation in law).  
 24. This was acknowledged in the majority opinion in Citizens United. “The great 
debates between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists over our founding document 
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corporations generally had no First Amendment rights because 
they had no authorization to engage in the activities protected by 
the First Amendment—that is, such activities were “ultra vires.”25 
The one exception—an important one that helps prove this 
general point—is that many religious organizations were 
chartered corporations, with explicit authority to engage in 
religious activities, and they would obviously be able to engage in 
religious activities protected by the Free Exercise clause of the 
First Amendment.26 
The year that the First Bank’s charter lapsed (1811) was the 
same year that New York became the first state to adopt a 
“general” incorporation statute for business corporations, by 
which any citizen could create a business corporation.27 Prior to 
that date, business corporations had continued to be specially 
created by one-off laws and hence close interactions between 
corporate founders and elected politicians.28 Even after that date, 
most new corporations continued to be specially chartered, 
creating a political/business system rife with opportunities for 
corruption that continued to characterize and challenge the 
 
were published and expressed in the most important means of mass communication of that 
era—newspapers owned by individuals.” 558 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added).  
 25. In the context of corporate political expenditures—i.e., “speech” under Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1974), see Mobile Gas Co. v. Patterson, 293 Fed. 208, 226 (M.D. Ala. 
1923) (finding that campaign contributions are personal expenditures of officers for rate-
making purposes); McConnell v. Combination Min. & Mill. Co., 31 Mont. 563, 79 Pac. 248 
(1905) (holding that expenses incurred in lobbying for passage of a bill charged to directors 
as beyond corporate purposes); People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 187 N.Y. 410, 439, 80 N.E. 
383, 386-89 (1907) (larceny prosecution for contributing corporate funds to political party). 
See also Opinion Letter to the Savings and Loan Commissioner, California Attorney 
General, October 14, 1960, p. 2 (finding that a statute broadening the power of 
corporations to permit charitable gifts does not extend to political causes) (cited in 
Corporate Political Affairs Programs, 70 YALE L.J. 821, 854 n. 206 (1961)). 
 26. 2 J. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 
24 (1917) at 16–17. 
 27. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 
at 109–39 (1977); Paddy Ireland, Capitalism without the Capitalist: The Joint Stock 
Company Share and the Emergence of the Modern Doctrine of Separate Corporate 
Personality, 17 J. LEG. HIST. 41-73 (1996); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN LAW 124–38, 511–31 (2d ed. 1985).  
 28. This fact was noted by the dissent in Citizens United, but ignored by the majority. 
“Those few corporations that existed at the founding were authorized by grant of a special 
legislative charter.” 130 S. Ct. at 949 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia’s concurrence 
tries to confuse the issue by noting (correctly) that “[a]t the time of the founding, religious, 
educational, and literary corporations were incorporated under general incorporation 
statutes, much as business corporations are today.” Id. at 926. However, he does not 
acknowledge that at that time—that is, at the time of the writing and adoption of the First 
Amendment—business corporations were not so covered by general incorporation 
statutes. See 2 J. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATIONS 24 (1917) at 16–17. 
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sensibilities of 19th century voters, lawyers, and courts.29 The battle 
over the Second Bank of the United States underlines the point: 
backers and foes alike occupied multiple roles as politicians, 
shareholders, borrowers, and backers of rival state banks. The 
structure and nature of the Second Bank was both for-profit and 
private, but also structured by its relations and terms of its 
engagement with the U.S. government.30 Alongside the fights over 
banks were struggles over canals and railroads,31 with the same 
mix of public/private characteristics persisting, with each 
transportation company needing special government action to 
create the rights of way and local monopolies, and to facilitate 
financing, even as the companies promised and in some cases 
generated significant public goods in the form of economic growth 
and rapidly increased public mobility. 
As Justice Scalia acknowledges in Citizens United, the 
“Founders” bore “resentment towards corporations.”32 He tries 
to blunt the force of this concession by arguing that this 
resentment existed only because they commonly held “state-
granted monopoly privileges,” which (he asserts) “modern 
corporations” do not have.33 But his argument falls short for 
several reasons, historical and modern. First, Berle and Means 
were the first to popularize the phrase “separation of ownership 
and control” but did not invent the concept, nor were they the first 
to identify it as a threat to social welfare. Founding-era observers 
such as Adam Smith critiqued large corporations not on the 
ground of monopoly power—which he famously identified as a 
risk of all business activity,34 and not solely of businesses 
organized as corporations—but also on the ground that dispersed 
ownership creates what would modernly be called agency 
problems towards which corporate and securities law have largely 
 
 29. CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR. & HENRY ADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE 
(Waveland Press 2002) (1871) (vividly recounting corrupt and violent stories of railroad 
corporation activity in the middle of the nineteenth century). 
 30. Hammond, supra note 21. 
 31. Harris, supra note 10. For the best treatment of English railway corporations, 
including vivid details on how corrupt and interconnected with state power they were, see 
generally R.W. KOSTAL, LAW AND ENGLISH RAILWAY CAPITALISM, 1825-1875 (1994). 
 32. 130 S. Ct. at 926. 
 33. Id. 
 34. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS 144 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976) (1776) (“People of the same trade seldom meet 
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy 
against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”).  
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been aimed at addressing.35 Second, the very fact that Founding-
era corporations commonly held monopolies makes it impossible 
to sort out which feature create their resentment—Scalia’s claim 
that it was their monopoly powers that created the resentment is 
not implausible, but it is inescapably speculative. Founding-era 
observers must have thought that grants of monopoly power 
generated social benefits, and were willing to grant special 
corporate legal status only because of those benefits, in which case 
the resentment would be more properly generated by special legal 
status, and not monopoly powers. 
From a modern perspective, the shortcomings of Scalia’s 
argument begin with the fact that many modern corporations—
including public utilities involved in cases such as Central 
Hudson—do in fact have privileges (special powers, barriers to 
entry, government contracts) similar to privileges of Founding-era 
corporations; so too with telecommunications companies, airlines, 
banks, railroads, defense contractors, and the rest of government-
dependent or -protected sectors that comprise roughly a third of 
the value of all privately owned business.36 In addition, all modern 
corporations enjoy legal benefits not enjoyed by individuals or 
unincorporated associations: limited liability, which transfers 
value from all potential tort victims into a subsidy for risky 
activities; asset partitioning, which greatly economizes on 
transaction costs and which some scholars have argued is the most 
important economic benefit of the corporate form;37 indefinite 
life, which in combination with separate tax identity for public 
corporations provides significant economic advantages; and the 
ability to sue and be sued as a fictional legal person. 
What can we take away from this capsule history of business 
corporations in England and the U.S.? First, the conception of 
business corporations as fully private, equivalent to individuals in 
operation, is a late development—emerging well after the 
adoption of the U.S. Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and even the 
Civil War Amendments. To the contrary corporations—even 
 
 35. Id. at 264–65 (“[D]irectors of [joint stock companies], being the managers rather 
of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartnery frequently watch over their own”).  
 36. For data on heavily regulated (and hence government-protected) and 
government-dependent sectors, see Coates, supra note 5, at Table 1.  
 37. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of 
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 393 (2000) (discussing significance of “asset 
partitioning”). 
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closely held ones—were viewed primarily as public,38 and as such 
subject to constitutionally imposed limitations, and often powers, 
but not affirmative rights against regulation.39 Second, the tools of 
“regulation” (not a word then in use, but a fair description) were 
varied, and included explicit limits in corporate charters, as well 
as explicit requirements (the Second Bank of the US, for example, 
was required to redeem notes in its charter40), short terms for 
charters (to require negotiated renewal), explicit bargains for 
charter grants, implicit bargains (sometimes corrupt or hidden), 
structural regulation (limiting, for example, the physical locations 
of corporate activities, including for example the routes of 
railroads or canals), grants of monopoly, of takings powers, and 
so on. Third, only in the Lochner41 era did corporations begin to 
function in a fully private fashion, and even then, even when 
business interests successfully used the Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses to achieve deregulatory (or, more accurately, 
re-regulatory) goals,42 the First Amendment was not a significant 
component of those efforts, as discussed more below. In sum, as 
discussed more below, the First Amendment played no significant 
role in facilitating the massive economic growth that accompanied 
the transportation revolution of the 19th century, nor did it 
significantly disrupt or slow down the backlash against the rapidly 
growing railroad companies and business trusts, as reflected in 
increasing federal regulation (e.g., the Interstate Commerce 
 
 38. For classic expositions of the heavily integrated public and private sectors in the 
early part of American history, see, for example, HARRY N. SCHEIBER, OHIO CANAL ERA 
(1968); OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE 
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774–1861 (2d 
ed. 1969); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956). See also Karen Orren, The Laws of 
Industrial Organizations, 1870–1920, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN 
AMERICA 531 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). 
 39. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity 
– Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. 
REV. 933, 945 (1952) (“Had the question come up, let us say, in 1800, when there were only 
300 recorded corporations in the United States...the lawyer arguing that they were purely 
private and, because private, not within the scope of constitutional limitations on 
governmental action would have had the difficult side of the argument.”).  
 40. Hammond, supra note 21. 
 41. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 42. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (explaining that corporations 
have liberty of contract, and due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment prevents state 
from barring corporate “citizen” from mailing a notice describing goods it seeks to insure 
under a policy issued by a foreign insurance company); Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust 
Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894) (holding that railroad corporations could not be required to 
charge less than tariff proposed by state railroad commission under due process clause if 
it would leave railroad unable to pay its debts); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 
U.S. 77, 90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). 
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Commission, established 188743) and the sometimes heavy hand 
of antitrust enforcement (e.g., the Standard Oil breakup in 
191044). 
B. A BRIEF TOUR OF LAWS REGULATING CORPORATE  
SPEECH IN LEGAL HISTORY 
Perhaps the above recounting of the history of the 
intertwining of corporations and law may seem off-point in an 
article on the First Amendment. Perhaps the “regulation” 
reflected in business history just reviewed can be separated from 
laws “abridging” the freedom of speech, including commercial 
speech generally, or corporate speech specifically. But a brief 
review of traditional laws relevant to the conduct of business—
both court-created and statutory—undermines this idea, too. The 
key point of this section is that commercial and corporate 
speech—in the most important activities of every business, 
including contract formation, retention and regulation of agents, 
and engaging in risk-taking activities—was pervasively regulated 
and structured by law long before the modern, expansive version 
of the First Amendment, which the next section will show was 
invented only recently. 
To quickly sketch how pervasively law regulated commercial 
speech throughout U.S. history, let us put aside the problems of 
any literal, textualist reading of the First Amendment, which 
would appear to curtail only Congress, and not the President or 
executive agencies. Let us also skip the usual problems for 
sweeping understandings of the First Amendment—e.g., laws 
against libel, threats, conspiracy, and obscenity that were long 
enforced before and after the First Amendment, with little sense 
of contradiction by anyone involved. Instead, let us focus on the 
pervasive sets of laws that constrained and burdened business 
speech. Specifically, consider how law “abridged” speech by those 
in business in their routine activities of forming contracts, hiring 
agents, and engaging in risk-taking. 
Regulation of Speech in Contract Formation. To form 
contracts, businesses must speak—indeed, as Robert Post has 
noted, “The process of contract formation . . . consists entirely of 
 
 43. For a historical comment on the Act by one of the founders of the oldest 
continuously operating US corporate law firm, Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP, see 
George W. Wickersham, Federal Control of Interstate Commerce, 23 HARV. L. REV. 241 
(1910). 
 44. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
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communication.”45 His laconic, passing observation is worth 
elaborating, to emphasize the economic significance of the speech 
so regulated. The combination of an intricate and sometimes 
counterintuitive body of law, on the one hand, with the way 
businesses and their representatives speak, on the other hand, 
determines whether a contract is formed, and if so, what its 
content is. At this intersection, the law routinely imposes 
economic penalties on businesses for speech or silence. 
Courts penalize certain types of speech by refusing to enforce 
contracts that are insufficiently definite,46 or which fail to 
specifically accept offers as made,47 or which include deceptive 
misrepresentations,48 or by finding enforceable contracts based on 
past conduct or course of dealing,49 or on words that are 
ambiguous as to their intent, all despite attempts to deny their 
existence, based on precisely how parties did or did not speak.50 
Contract law also “implies” what it calls “representations” or 
“warranties” from context, unless contracting parties make 
specific statements to deny liability51—effectively compelling 
speech. Quasi-contract doctrines like promissory estoppel are 
founded on speech acts.52 
A form of contract historically important to economic growth 
was the promissory or negotiable bill or note—a form of writing 
that was intended to allow value to pass among strangers to 
 
 45. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech 9 (Yale Law School 
Faculty Scholarship Series, Working Paper No. 190, 2000).  
 46. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2003) (finding that “the indefiniteness doctrine lives on in the 
common law of contracts”).  
 47. See, e.g., Glenway Industries, Inc. v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 686 F.2d 415 (6th 
Cir. 1982) (noting that under Pennsylvania law, offeror is “master of the offer” and unless 
offeree accepts in accordance with terms of offer, offeree cannot sue on contract or in 
reliance). 
 48. See, e.g., Sabo v. Delman, 3 N.Y.2d 155 (N.Y. 1957) (finding that the contract 
could be rescinded based on promises to finance business not intended to be kept when 
made). 
 49. See Restatement of Contracts § 69 (silence may constitute acceptance based on 
intent and facts). 
 50. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59, and RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 60, with U.C.C. § 2-207, each of which treats ambiguous 
communications responding to a contract offer differently in determining contract 
formation. 
 51. See, e.g., In re Mercer, 246 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[E]ach use of pre-approved 
credit card by Chapter 7 debtor was in nature of implied representation by debtor of her 
intent to repay any credit extended[.]”).  
 52. See Eric M. Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 263 (1996). 
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facilitate trade and finance.53 Attempts to restrict the assignability 
of notes—a particular form of written speech—could turn on 
minor differences in language.54 More modernly, notes have to 
take a particular form to be negotiable,55 and significant 
differences in legal outcomes could (and still can) turn on minor 
differences in language. In particular, defenses to enforcement 
could depend on small variations in word choice and form of 
writing. Similarly important categories of business transaction are 
those involving real estate and security interests, each of which 
require special speech-acts—including the recording of transfers 
or security interests—to accomplish the goals of those market 
transactions. Indeed, Homer Kripke long ago suggested that in 
the context of security interests the word “perfection” be replaced 
with “giving (or excusing) public notice”—i.e., the making of a 
particular form of legally required speech act.56 
Regulation of Speech in Hiring Agents. Beyond contract law, 
courts use the common law of agency effectively to force those 
owning or running businesses to speak to third parties about who 
has authority to bind the business (whether organized as 
corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship),57 and to impose 
contract liabilities for loose speech that implies that someone is 
agent, even if the corporation’s internal communications make it 
clear that they are not. Agency law also regulates speech by 
decreeing that words equivalent to direction of the physical 
conduct of their activities render an agent an “employee” (or, in 
older usage, a “servant”) capable of producing tort liability on the 
speaking principal.58 Agents, in turn, are subject to duties of 
 
 53. J. M. HOLDEN, THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN ENGLISH LAW 
(1955); JAMES S. ROGERS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES: A 
STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LAW (1995). 
 54. See e.g., Z. SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE . . . AND A TREATISE ON 
BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES 298 (1810) (“All bills payable to a certain 
person, or order, or to the order of a certain person; or to a certain person, or bearer; or to 
the bearer generally: or where equivalent words are used: are transferable by indorsement, 
or delivering from hand to hand, ad infinitum: so as to vest the assignee with a right of 
action, on the instrument against the parties to it, in his own name. This is what constitutes 
the negotiable quality of the instrument[.]”) (cited in James S. Rogers, The Myth of 
Negotiability, 31 B.C. L. REV. 265 n.20 (1990)). 
 55. For the modern legal test, see U.C.C. § 3-104 (defining “negotiable instrument” 
by excluding writings that include undertakings beyond the promise to pay money, with 
certain exceptions). 
 56. See Peter F. Coogan, Article 9—An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J. 
1012, 1032 n.75 (1978).  
 57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (defining apparent authority). 
 58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (defining respondeat superior); § 
7.07 (defining “employee”). 
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loyalty, which includes subsidiary duties not to speak about 
confidences learned from or about their principals, even when the 
speech touches on the public interest, First Amendment 
notwithstanding.59 
Regulation of Speech in Risk-Taking. When businesses 
engage in risky activities, that may impose harms on third parties, 
the way they speak (to warn, for example) can influence their 
liability.60 Tort and fraudulent conveyance law punishes not only 
fraud by forbidding misleading speech, but also forms of silence, 
effectively compelling speech in specified settings.61 Corporate 
law requires those seeking to use the corporate form to “speak” 
by creating and filing public charters, disclosing their purposes 
and governance.62 Antitrust law forbids agreements in restraint of 
trade, including companies from agreeing (a form of speech) to 
fix prices, which may be inferred from sharing information (i.e., 
speaking to each other) about prices.63 More general doctrines—
waiver, estoppel—impose liability as a result of speech in a wide 
variety of settings without running afoul of the First 
Amendment.64 
Regulation of Speech in the Modern Regulatory State. All of 
these doctrines pre-date the modern regulatory state, and have 
evolved significantly since then, and continue to do so, sometimes 
shaped by statutory interventions. Beginning in the early 
twentieth century, accelerating in the New Deal, and then surging 
again in the 1960s, the modern regulatory state brought into 
widespread acceptance a wide array of additional laws that curtail 
or burden speech: securities laws, consumer protection laws, 
truth-in-lending laws, common carrier laws, professional licensing 
 
 59. Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923 (M.D.N.C. 1997). 
 60. See, e.g., Oberson v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Forest Service et al., 514 F.3d 989 
(2010) (finding that failure to post a warning sign on a dangerous trail created tort liability 
for negligence on the part of Forest Service). 
 61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (liability for nondisclosure under 
various circumstances). 
 62. See, e.g., Delaware General Corporation Law § 102 (setting required provisions 
in publicly filed corporate charter, including “purposes” and any deviations from default 
corporate statutory provisions for governance). 
 63. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Electric Corp. et al. v. General Electric Company, et al., 
244 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (communication of price sheets and related topics among 
competitors provided evidence of price-fixing conspiracy violating Sherman Act). 
 64. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 570 U.S. 663 (1991) (“Minnesota doctrine 
of promissory estoppel is a law of general applicability ... [and] enforcement of such general 
laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to 
enforcement against other persons or organizations...”). 
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laws, etc.65 This is not to mention the specific laws barring the 
“active promotion of prescription drugs, liquor, cigarettes, and 
other products” noted by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in 
Virginia Pharmacy.66 And, of course, as noted by the majority in 
Citizens United: 
At least since the latter part of the 19th century, the laws of 
some States and of the United States imposed a ban on 
corporate direct contributions to candidates.67 
These statutes, regulations, and related court interpretations 
are varied in content and effect, but worth emphasizing is that 
many in practice track elements of the common law doctrines 
reviewed above,68 or alter them while preserving other elements.69 
As a result, it is hard to see any reason not to extend to much of 
these modern statutes and regulations any general presumption 
that common law doctrines of ancient vintage or general 
applicability are exempted from strict or intermediate scrutiny, or 
otherwise treated lightly, under from the First Amendment. Many 
of these laws have also been challenged under the First 
Amendment in recent years, as discussed below. 
But before turning to a review of the First Amendment 
challenges, a simple point should here be recognized: these laws 
all predate any understanding of First Amendment doctrine that 
includes a distinct commercial speech component, first announced 
in Virginia Pharmacy, and none were seriously viewed as contrary 
to the First Amendment at the time they were adopted. 
 
 65. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.; Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301 et seq.; Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1966, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1451–61; Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (implemented in, for example, 
6 Del. Ch. 25; Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601; Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-104; N.Y. DR 3-101 (unauthorized practice of law)). 
 66. 425 U.S. at 781. 
 67. 130 S. Ct. at 900 (citing B. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE REFORM 23 (2001)).  
 68. Many consumer protection laws, for example, contain anti-fraud provisions that 
are substantially similar to the common law of fraud. See, e.g., 6 DEL. CODE ANN. 
§ 2532(a)(4) (“A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when ... that person ... uses 
deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in connection with goods 
or services”). For an overview of consumer protection laws, see MARY DEE PRIDGEN, 
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW (2013).  
 69. The federal securities laws, for example, largely track the common law of fraud, 
but eliminate, modify, or reverse certain common law elements, such as scienter, privity, 
or damages. See JOEL SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (3d ed. 2003). 
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C. THE NON-ROLE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN ECONOMIC 
HISTORY 
The last section described how pervasively corporate and 
commercial speech was regulated throughout legal history. In this 
section, I briefly review First Amendment history to show that 
this pervasive regulation long pre-dated modern First 
Amendment doctrines, to show how radical modern First 
Amendment doctrine is, as applied to corporate and commercial 
speech, and to show that the doctrine is a poor fit with the 
inevitable need for political compromise in the American method 
of lawmaking. The chronology—pervasive speech regulation of 
commerce before development of First Amendment doctrine—
and the fact that modern business use of the First Amendment 
represents a radical break with the history and traditions of U.S. 
law should quite important to anyone who purports to be a strong 
originalist in interpreting the Constitution. It should also be of 
relevance to anyone with even a partially originalist 
understanding of the U.S. Constitution. Finally, it has also an 
important implication for policy judgments about how important 
or valuable modern First Amendment doctrine is in advancing 
economic growth and social welfare. The incompatibility of the 
doctrine with American political realities only reinforces the 
problematic nature of the corporate takeover of the First 
Amendment. 
The facts of the chronology that follows will be familiar to 
constitutional scholars but perhaps less so to corporate scholars. 
Most basically, it may be surprising to non-specialists that the 
First Amendment as we know it today is a recent judicial 
invention. For the first half of U.S. history, it played only a modest 
role in law, as reflected in legal decisions and the opinions of 
famous jurists. As late as 1907, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
stated that the First Amendment did not apply to the states and, 
even as applied to Congress, its “main purpose” was to “to 
prevent . . . previous restraints upon publications as had been 
practiced by other governments,” “not [to] prevent the 
subsequent punishment of such [publications] as may be deemed 
contrary to the public welfare.”70 Already by that point, well 
before the Supreme Court used the First Amendment to strike 
 
 70. Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. the Attorney General of the State of Colorado, 205 
U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (Holmes, J.); cf. Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First 
Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1156, 1202 (1986) (“The Supreme Court . . . did not decide 
a case involving prior restraint until 1931 . . . and did not consider a case involving judicial 
prior restraint . . . until 1968.”). 
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down a law, the U.S. economy had become the richest in the 
world,71 as depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Source: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm 
 
The Supreme Court did not rely on the First Amendment to 
strike down a law of any kind until 1931—that is, 140 years after 
the First Amendment was adopted—and no federal law until 
1965.72 Even accounting for prior cases refusing to enforce laws as 
 
 71.  See MADDISON-PROJECT, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/
home.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2015) (discussing per capita GDP by country over time) 
and http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2015) (discussing 
aggregate GDP by country over time). 
 72.  Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (first case voiding a state law under 
the First Amendment); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (first case 
voiding a federal law under the First Amendment). One earlier case, Fiske v. Kansas, 274 
U.S. 380 (1927), struck down a state law under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as representing an “arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police power, 
unwarrantably infringing the liberty of the defendant,” in context where the conduct in 
question consisted of speech and references were made in the state court opinion to the 
challenges based on the “constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech,” which that court 
had rejected. Still earlier cases in and following World War I, famously including opinions 
enunciating the “clear and present danger test,” in which Justices Holmes and Brandeis 
began to articulate a broader conception of First Amendment protections, nevertheless 
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applied, the First Amendment was not a significant part of the 
legal arsenal for the protection of business or economic activity 
prior to the second half of the twentieth century. The landmark 
cases that have given the First Amendment its prominence since 
the middle of the twentieth century were primarily concerned 
with individuals acting outside of that context: dissidents,73 public 
employees,74 students,75 and civil rights activists.76 
As shown in the empirical analysis in Part II, cases in which 
businesses were the direct beneficiaries of judicial review of laws 
for violations of the right to free speech are even more recent. The 
first such case (Joseph Burstyn, Inc.77) did not occur until 1952,78 
and the doctrine of “commercial speech,” in which businesses 
speak not for expressive purposes but for primarily business 
purposes, was not accepted in the Supreme Court until Virginia 
Pharmacy,79 in 1976. Nor was the First Amendment extended to 
corporate political activity until 1978, in Bellotti, nor was it 
articulated in its modern form—complete with the requirement 
that a law be well-tailored to fit its purpose to survive First 
Amendment scrutiny—until Central Hudson,80 in 1980. 
Each of these three cases is worth discussing briefly for three 
reasons. First, each is an important part of the foundation for 
contemporary controversial cases such as Citizens United and 
Hobby Lobby. Second, each was controversial at the time, 
generated strong dissents by the generally pro-business Justice 
 
Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 
CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1171 (1982). 
 73. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) 
(children whose parents object to flag salute could not be compelled to do so); Yates et al. 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (overturning convictions of officials of the 
Communist Party USA, Court narrowly interpreted federal statute making it unlawful to 
advocate overthrow of government, articulating “clear and present danger” test). 
 74. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 391 U.S. 563 (1968) 
(holding that teacher may not be dismissed for letter to newspaper critical of school 
budget). 
 75. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
(holding that students “do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate”).  
 76. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (finding that state 
government officials violated the First Amendment by ordering an end to an orderly and 
otherwise lawful civil rights march in front of the state house).  
 77. 343 U.S. 495. 
 78. Burstyn is the oldest case cited in the string cite in Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 
900, laying out the “historical” case for its premise that corporations have First 
Amendment rights. An older case, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), 
resulted in a finding that a tax aimed specifically at newspaper businesses violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause by abridging the freedom of the press.  
 79. 425 U.S. 748. 
 80. 447 U.S. 557. 
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Rehnquist, and as will be suggested in the discussion, each 
remains vulnerable to legal critique. Third, each is a reflection of 
what has been fairly characterized as a “movement” among 
businesses and conservatives that began in the early 1970s,81 which 
itself is an important part of context for understanding these cases 
and their potential effects. This movement was stimulated in part 
by the 1971 “Powell memo,” in which Lewis Powell—before he 
went on the Supreme Court—advocated that the Chamber of 
Commerce undertake a broad, multi-channel effort at mobilizing 
corporations and their resources to defend capitalism and the 
“free enterprise system.” 82 
This movement was needed, Powell asserted, to defend 
against a growing and dangerous movement of academics, media, 
intellectuals, clergy, and politicians to attack business and 
capitalism, by pushing such ideas as consumerism and 
environmental protection. “Under our constitutional system,” he 
wrote, “especially with an activist-minded Supreme Court, the 
judiciary may be the most important instrument for social, 
economic and political change.” In other words, Powell’s memo 
advocated using the courts not simply to enforce or interpret the 
law—the standard publicly stated understanding of political 
conservatives such as Chief Justice Roberts83—but to change the 
law. 
In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court held that the First 
Amendment overrides laws abridging commercial speech, 
arguing that the distinction between commercial and other speech 
was “simplistic” and difficult to draw. Since no pharmacy sought 
 
 81.  ROBERT L. KERR, THE CORPORATE FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT (2008). As Kerr 
notes at 7, the Business Roundtable was formed in 1972, which helped push previously 
politically moderate trade groups such as the Chamber of Commerce and the National 
Association of Manufacturers to the right. Kerr’s account is similar to that told by The 
Economist editors John Micklethwait and Adrian Woolridge. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT 
& ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE FOURTH REVOLUTION: THE GLOBAL RACE TO 
REINVENT THE STATE (2014). 
 82. See Memorandum from Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr. to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Education 
Committee Chairman, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971), available at 
law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%20Archives/PowellMemorandumTypescript.pdf 
[hereinafter Powell Memorandum]. The Powell Memorandum was less than two months 
old before Powell was nominated to serve as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, but not publicly released until after he had been confirmed on the Court. 
See Mark Schmitt, The Legend of the Powell Memo, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Apr. 27, 
2005), available at http://prospect.org/article/legend-powell-memo.  
 83. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 31 
(2005) (statement of John Roberts) (testifying that judges should be “umpires” who “don’t 
make the rules; they apply them”).  
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to “speak” (i.e., advertise the drug prices as had been banned in 
the law under review), the Court focused instead on the interest 
of the audience – the consumer – to “hear” the forbidden speech 
(i.e., drug price advertising), an interest the Court thought 
“keener . . . than . . . the day’s most urgent political debate.” In so 
holding, the Court explicitly overruled several of its precedents, 
which had established the proposition that commercial speech 
was in fact entitled to less, or no, First Amendment protection, 
including cases from 194284 and 1951,85 and repudiated dicta from 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), which had stressed that 
the speech in that case was “not ‘purely commercial.’”86 Citing 
several of its precedents in which bans on speech by individuals or 
expressive businesses (film companies, newspapers, etc.87) were 
found unconstitutional, the Court extended First Amendment 
protection to any (non-deceptive) expression by any business—a 
dramatic if subtle expansion of the reach of the Courts in 
overseeing economic regulation. Nowhere did the Court note or 
discuss the significance of the broad and traditional range of laws 
and regulations that had long regulated commercial speech 
without comment or First Amendment challenge, such as those 
reviewed above. 
Two years after Virginia Pharmacy, in First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti,88 the Court extended it into a domain just 
opened up by the equation of money with speech in Buckley v. 
Valeo89 in 1976. Revealing political ambitions that Justice Powell 
had long secretly harbored but were unknown to the public when 
he was appointed to the Court,90 Powell’s opinion in Bellotti 
affirmed in the strongest terms a corporate “right” to free 
expression, founded in the simple logic that corporations were 
(legally) people, and people have rights under the First 
 
 84. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (upholding a statute banning handbills on 
streets). 
 85. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (upholding an ordinance banning door-to-
door magazine subscriptions). 
 86. 376 U.S. 254. 
 87. See, e.g., id.; Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Smith v. California, 361 
U.S. 147 (1959). 
 88. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 89. 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (“A restriction on the amount of money a person or group 
can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity 
of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, 
and the size of the audience reached.”). 
 90. See Schmitt, supra note 82. 
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Amendment, and through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment rights against the states.91 
This syllogism held (said the Court) even though the law in 
question permitted corporations to speak about political issues 
affecting corporate property, and only banned the use of 
corporate funds to speak on other political issues, and so could 
have been readily understood as a restraint on how corporate 
managers spend corporate (i.e., shareholder) money for non-
corporate purposes, rather than as a ban on corporate speech 
generally. This syllogism held even though the Court had 
previously upheld complete bans on union and corporate 
donations to political candidates.92 This syllogism held despite 
Powell’s earlier dissent in Pipefitters, in which he expressed 
dismay at the majority opinion in that case, because it “open[ed] 
the way for major participation in politics by the largest 
aggregations of economic power, the great unions and 
corporations.”93 To be sure, in Bellotti, the Court held back from 
a full-bore equation of corporations with individuals, noting that 
since this case concerned “a corporation’s right to speak on issues 
of general public interest,” the holding implied “no comparable 
right in the quite different context of participation in a political 
campaign for election to public office,” and “Congress might well 
be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or 
apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations 
to influence candidate elections.”94 
In Central Hudson, the Court went farther. Claiming to base 
its formulation on prior cases (Virginia Pharmacy,95 Bates,96 
Primus,97 Bellotti,98 and Carey99), the Court articulated the still-
 
 91. 435 U.S. at 780–81 and nn.14–15. 
 92. See e.g., United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 568 (1957) (enforcing Federal 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1935 over dissent that emphasized that the law “as construed and 
applied, is a broadside assault on the freedom of political expression guaranteed by the 
First Amendment”).  
 93. Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 443 (1972). 
 94. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n. 26. 
 95. Virginia Pharm. Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) 
(holding unconstitutional a law forbidding pharmacies from advertising drug prices). 
 96. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a 
law banning advertising of legal services). 
 97. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (holding that a law barring solicitation of 
prospective litigation clients was unconstitutional). 
 98. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (holding 
unconstitutional a law forbidding a corporation from spending money on ballot initiatives 
not affecting property, business or assets of corporation). 
 99. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (finding unconstitutional a 
law banning advertising of contraceptives ). 
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dominant multi-step test for commercial speech cases. First, in a 
step often not articulated formally, the Court determines if the 
case involves “commercial speech” – if not, it applies some other 
doctrinal analysis. Second, if it does involve commercial speech, 
the Court asks if the speech concerns lawful activity and is not 
misleading – if not, then the speech is not protected at all.100 If so, 
then the laws must pass three tests to be constitutional: (a) they 
must serve “substantial” government interests, (b) they must do 
so “directly” and (c) they may restrict no more speech than 
“necessary,” referred to as the “fit” requirement. 
The Court’s purported precedents in Central Hudson in fact 
provided only weak support for the test it articulated. Primus 
involved a non-profit public interest law firm, not a business, and 
the speech was held by the Court to be a “form of political 
expression,” entitled to the highest form of First Amendment 
protection, not the nominally lower protection afforded 
commercial speech even after Central Hudson. Bellotti likewise 
involved political activity, albeit in the form of corporate 
expenditures. Carey, cited in Central Hudson to support its fit 
requirement, expressly noted that the law was not aimed at 
commercial speech, but “at the ideas conveyed and form of 
expression.”101 While Bates did suggest that laws short of a flat ban 
might have survived scrutiny, consistent with the fit requirement 
in Central Hudson, it nowhere suggested that to survive a law 
could only go so far as “necessary” to achieve a substantial public 
interest, but instead simply acknowledged that “many of the 
problems in defining the boundary between deceptive and non-
deceptive advertising remain to be resolved,” and even suggested 
that laws might constitutionally restrict advertisements of the 
“quality of services” where the quality could not be measured or 
 
 100. In this respect, the test is weaker than in political or other individual, non-
commercial speech contexts, where falsity is generally not a reason to eliminate First 
Amendment protection altogether. Compare N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 
(because “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, “ even false statements of fact 
must be protected to some extent, “if the freedom of expression [is] to have ‘breathing 
space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive’”), with United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) 
(holding unconstitutional a law criminalizing false statements about having a military 
medal), with Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 468 (1942) (“prevention and 
punishment” of “libelous” speech is “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are 
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] 
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality”), and Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (finding that criminal prosecution of defamation is 
constitutional). 
 101. 431 U.S. at 702 n.28. 
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verified.102 Central Hudson was a bold and aggressive example of 
judicial activism, and paved the way for a corporate takeover of 
the First Amendment—right in line with Powell’s 1971 memo 
calling for a new corporate political movement to work its will 
through the courts.103 In practice, as documented in Part II, 
Central Hudson has provided an open invitation to courts to strike 
down laws “abridging” speech by businesses, even if the laws 
serve concededly “substantial” and legitimate purposes, even if 
the interests are served in a straightforward and intuitive fashion, 
and even if the speech in question has no political or ideological 
content. 
A recent case—POM Wonderful, LLC104—illustrates the way 
the “fit” requirement has transformed the nominally 
“intermediate” form of judicial review under Central Hudson into 
a blank check for activist judges to de- or re-regulate on behalf of 
businesses. In POM Wonderful, LLC, a panel of the D.C. Circuit 
considered a Federal Trade Commission order requiring that 
“health claims” used in marketing food products be substantiated 
by “competent and reliable scientific evidence that is sufficient in 
quality and quantity,” and that unless the evidence included at 
least two randomly controlled trial (RCT) studies, the marketing 
had to include qualifying language indicating the research was 
“preliminary” or “initial.” While conceding the intuitively 
obvious justification for the order as serving “substantial” 
governmental interests in protecting consumers from misleading 
claims, and that the order directly served those interests, the 
Court found that the order did not “fit” the purpose served, 
because—in the Court’s opinion, nowhere supported by meta-
studies about the reliability of RCTs or the relevance of statistical 
significance in a single RCT—one RCT might be just as good as 
two at substantiating the claims. Even a casual review of the 
literature on science would have provided ample ground for a 
neutral observer to want to see more than one study before letting 
a corporate marketing machine take a run at an unsuspecting 
public with unqualified claims based on “science.”105 While the 
 
 102. 433 U.S. 383–84. 
 103. See generally Powell Memorandum, supra note 82. 
 104. POM Wonderful, LLC v. FTC, 2015 WL 394093 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2015). 
 105. See, e.g., RETRACTION WATCH, http://retractionwatch.com (website devoted to 
retractions of peer-reviewed published articles in a range of sciences) (last visited March 
21, 2015); Daniele Fanelli, How Many Scientists Fabricate and Falsify Research? A 
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Survey Data, PLOS ONE 1 (May 29, 2009) (“In 
surveys asking about the behavior of colleagues, admission rates were 14.12% for 
falsification,” “misconduct was reported more frequently by medical/pharmacological 
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Court attempted to argue that if the FTC had found, in the specific 
case, reason to doubt the one study, it could have justified 
requiring a second study, the Court nowhere explained why a 
prophylactic rule requiring two studies was not a reasonable fit to 
an order limiting unqualified marketing claims. 
The bottom line lesson of POM Wonderful LLC is clear: 
regulatory agencies under Central Hudson face a strong risk that 
a court will be able to exploit any mismatch between the court’s 
(often uneducated or even ignorant) view of what is “necessary” 
to accomplish the agency’s goals to strike down a regulation. 
Lurking in the background of the “fit” requirement, as also 
illustrated by POM Wonderful LLC, is a politically naïve (or 
disingenuous) notion often trotted out in cases under Central 
Hudson that agencies or legislatures can simply rewrite their 
regulations or statutes with minimal effort and delay, to bring 
them into line with the court’s view of what is “necessary” to 
achieve the valid purposes of the regulation or statute. Such 
naivete is hard to understand in an era of political logjams, “do-
nothing” Congresses, and increasingly bitter and polarized 
politics, which make it more likely that the result of a court 
striking down a law is that it will stay struck. It also flies in the face 
of long-standing theory underwriting at least some jurists’ 
resistance to the use of legislative history—i.e., that a multi-
member regulatory or legislative body is not an “it” but a “they,” 
and unlike the text of the rule or the statute, legislative history 
reflects only a subset of the members’ views, rather than the 
compromise reflected in the final text. This perspective should be 
remembered when evaluating the “fit” requirement of Central 
Hudson in practice, because it is a reminder that imperfectly 
fitting rules and statutes are part of the price of political 
compromise, which is the essence of the American method of 
lawmaking. 
Putting this short history of the First Amendment and its 
application to commercial speech together with the business and 
legal history above, the bottom line is that the First Amendment 
had no operative legal role in creating or sustaining the great era 
of US economic growth that began in the 19th century and 
continued through the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, during most of 
American history, at most, the First Amendment served 
 
researchers than others . . . [and] it appears likely that this is a conservative estimate of the 
true prevalence of scientific misconduct”), available at http://journals.plos.org/plosone/
article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0005738. 
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principally as a symbol and hortatory summation of the value of 
free expression by individuals, and even after the Supreme Court 
began striking down laws in the 1930s and 1940s, it did not 
commonly do so for business (as will be shown more 
systematically in Part II).106 These roles for the First Amendment 
might have played a role in the political restraint of regulation of 
expression generally, and perhaps even by businesses in limited 
contexts (such as expressive businesses, such as newspapers), but 
the First Amendment played little to no role in restraining the 
regulation of commercial speech as such, until the recent era 
inaugurated in Virginia Pharmacy. Too many statutes and 
regulations, and too many courts using too many common law 
doctrines, routinely and pervasively regulated speech by 
businesses prior to the 1970s, with little general public complaint 
or widespread efforts to resist on the ground that those laws 
violated the First Amendment, for any fair understanding of U. S. 
economic history to assert otherwise. While the ramp-up in 
business regulation in the late 1960s and early 1970s might have 
justified political concerns by business groups, as illustrated by the 
Powell memo, nothing in U.S. business history or its legal or 
constitutional traditions did so. The corporate takeover of the 
First Amendment is a modern doctrinal invention. 
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE CORPORATE 
TAKEOVER OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Let us test the historical summary set out in Part I.C against 
some case data. This Part analyzes data from Supreme Court and 
Circuit Court decisions to illustrate how recently the corporate 
takeover of the First Amendment has occurred, and how 
pervasively and systematically corporations have been using the 
First Amendment to achieve de- or re-regulatory goals. To my 
knowledge, this quantitative exercise has not been previously 
undertaken. The findings are that (a) prior to Virginia Pharmacy 
only expressive businesses challenging laws that directly impeded 
their core business were able to convince the Court to strike down 
laws on their behalf, and not other businesses seeking to achieve 
de- or re-regulatory goals generally; (b) First Amendment cases 
in which businesses are the primary beneficiary have increasingly 
displaced cases in which individuals are the primary beneficiary, 
 
 106. Geoffrey R. Stone’s fascinating book, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WAR 
TIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004), for example, 
does not mention commercial speech, businesses, corporations, or any related topic. 
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with the docket now roughly split between business and individual 
cases; (c) the Central Hudson doctrine has encouraged an 
increasing number of commercial speech cases to be brought over 
time; and (d) cases currently in the Courts of Appeal under 
Central Hudson predominantly do not involve expressive 
businesses, but are attacks on laws and regulations that inhibit 
“speech” by other kinds of businesses in areas of activity 
incidental or instrumental to their core profit-making activity. 
A. THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN THE SUPREME COURT’S FIRST 
AMENDMENT DECISIONS 
i. Data and Coding 
This subsection starts with all U.S. Supreme Court cases in 
the Supreme Court Database (“SCD”),107 which ranges from 1946 
to the present (n=12908 as of the date that the data were 
downloaded, in December 2014). After dropping 68 records that 
on inspection were duplicates or cases closely related to other 
records, the resulting data set includes 423 unique Supreme Court 
decisions involving speech, press or assembly under the First 
Amendment.108 The cases were then coded for whether they 
involved a business, an individual or some other kind of party 
(usually a government entity), in what combination, and which 
type of party won. Victories were distinguished between those in 
which a party defeated an attempt to persuade the Court to strike 
down a law or regulation under the First Amendment and those 
in which a party succeeded in so persuading a Court to strike 
down a law or regulation.109 
 
 107. THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu (last visited March 21, 
2015). 
 108. SCD codes cases in several ways, including a field called “Legal Provision 
Supplement” (“Legal Supp” in the database itself). One case type within “Legal Supp” is 
assigned the number 200 by SCD, and consists of cases involving “First Amendment 
(speech, press and assembly)” (n=491).  
 109. For purposes of distinguishing businesses, individuals and other kinds of parties, 
the following steps were taken. First, the SCD numerical codes for “petitioner” and 
“respondent” were mapped into “business,” “individual” and “other,” in generally 
straightforward ways. For example, any governmental entity or official was coded as 
“other,” as were parties coded by SCD as universities, churches, public utility commissions, 
eleemosynary institutions, public interest organizations, judges and unions. Parties coded 
by SCD as corporations or businesses were coded as “business,” as were power companies, 
telephone companies or utilities, banks, radio or television stations or networks, trade 
organizations, shopping centers and restaurants. Parties coded by SCD as individuals were 
coded as “individuals,” as were employees, aliens, authors, draftees, juveniles, political 
candidates, private persons, protestors, racial minorities, journalists, and students. The 
remaining categories were ambiguous. A significant subset consisted of expressive 
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ii. Summary Statistics 
Over the full period of the dataset, based on the above 
classification, 63% of the cases involved at least one individual 
party, and a slightly overlapping subset of 30% involving at least 
one business party, with the remaining cases consisting of disputes 
between other kinds of parties (e.g., university vs. government, 
government official vs. government, etc.). The ratio of business to 
individual First Amendment cases overall was 0.48. 
Consistent with standard doctrinal histories and the review in 
Part I.C, Virginia Pharmacy (1976) marks a clear shift in the data. 
Prior to Virginia Pharmacy, businesses were involved in 26% of 
the 176 cases, or 1.5 per year, while afterwards they were involved 
in 34% of the 246 cases, or 2.2 per year. These increases for 
business are statistically significant at a 95% level. These increases 
are not due to an overall increase in First Amendment cases over 
time – the overall linear time trend in the number of such cases is 
almost zero. The increase in business cases remains significant 
with linear time (annual) controls. The annual number of First 
Amendment cases involving individuals actually decreased from 
4.3 per year prior to Virginia Pharmacy to 3.6 per year after that 
case. Both absolutely, and relative to individuals, business has 
been involved in significantly more First Amendment cases to the 
Supreme Court in the thirty-eight years since Virginia Pharmacy 
than in the prior thirty-eight years. 
The increase in First Amendment cases involving businesses 
is depicted in Figure 2, which plots a five-year moving average of 
the percentage of such cases as a share of the Supreme Court’s 
First Amendment docket as a whole. Visual inspection reveals 
four periods: the period prior to the 1950s, when business cases 
were missing altogether; the period from the 1950s thorough the 
early 1970s, when cases represented roughly 20% of the Court’s 
First Amendment docket; the period from the mid-1970s through 
the late 1980s, when such cases rose steeply and steadily before 
leveling off at around 40% of the Court’s First Amendment 
docket; and then the period since the late 1980s, during which they 
have varied but represented a roughly stable share between 35% 
and 40%. What constitutional law scholars will already have 
 
businesses that could be operated by an individual or an incorporated entity: bookstores, 
movie theatres, art exhibitors, newspapers, and publishers. These, as well as other 
ambiguous party identities (for example, farmers, which included individuals and 
agribusinesses) were classified based on a review of the specific captioned parties – if the 
caption included “Incorporated,” “Corporation” or similar indicators of corporate status, 
they were classified as “business,” and otherwise as “individual.”  
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noted is that period 3—the period of rising First Amendment 
cases involving businesses—coincides with the presence on the 
Court of Justice Powell, who served from 1972 to 1987. 
 
 
Figure 2. Source: Author calculations, http://scdb.wustl.edu 
 
Business “win” rates also rose dramatically after Virginia 
Pharmacy. Prior to that case, business won 20% of its First 
Amendment cases, compared to a 41% win rate for individuals. 
After Virginia Pharmacy, business and individual win rates were 
roughly equivalent at 55% each. Again, the differences are robust 
to overall time trends—while both kinds of parties won more 
frequently, businesses won more frequently after Virginia 
Pharmacy than can be accounted for by the overall increase alone, 
while individuals’ victories are in line with the time trend. 
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These changes over time in the role of business in First 
Amendment cases is larger once the cases are analyzed to see if 
business is seeking to use the First Amendment affirmatively, to 
strike down a law or regulation, rather than defensively, to uphold 
a law or regulation. In the 1940s, and a few times since then, 
unions sought to have the Supreme Court strike down open shop 
or anti-picketing laws as violating union members’ First 
Amendment rights—generally to no avail.110 Business 
involvement in those cases was defensive—they were not seeking 
to use the First Amendment to overturn legislation, but were 
defending the outcome of the popular legislative process against 
potential court intervention. Excluding defensive cases and 
focusing solely on offensive uses of the First Amendment, 
business cases and win rates fall by roughly a third in the pre-
Virginia Pharmacy era, but not after. 
A final point to make about the “offensive” First 
Amendment cases prior to Virginia Pharmacy involving business 
is that they almost always involved attacks on laws barring or 
 
 110. See, e.g., Lincoln Federal Labor Union et al. v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co. et al., 335 
U.S. 525 (1949) (holding that open shop laws did not violate union members’ First 
Amendment rights); Am. Fed’n Of Labor et al. v. American Sash & Door Co. et al., 335 
U.S. 538 (1949) (same); Giboney et al. v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) 
(upholding anti-picketing law used against union under First Amendment); Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters, Etc. Union, Local 309, et al. v. Hanke et al., d/b/a Atlas Auto Rebuild, 339 U.S. 
470 (1950) (same); Bldg. Serv. Emps. International Union, Local 262, et al. v. Gazzam, 339 
U.S. 532 (1950) (same); International Brotherhood pf Teamsters, Local 695, A.F.L., et al. 
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restricting expressive businesses—i.e., the business of the business 
party itself—whereas after Virginia Pharmacy they began 
increasingly to involve attacks on laws regulating speech, such as 
advertising, that was incidental or instrumental in the business of 
the business party, brought by non-expressive businesses. The 
first businesses to win First Amendment victories in the Supreme 
Court illustrate typical expressive business cases. In Grosjean v. 
American Press Co.,111 the Court found the right to a free press 
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause conflicted with a two percent gross receipts tax imposed 
by Louisiana solely on individuals or corporations engaged in the 
business of ad-based large-circulation newspapers, magazines or 
similar publications, at the behest of Governor Huey Long, who 
was generally understood to be retaliating against the newspapers 
for being critical of his administration.112 In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. 
Wilson,113 the Court found that a New York statute authorizing 
the appointment by the Board of Regents of a head of the motion 
picture division of New York State’s Board of Regents (which has 
authority over education policy in the state) to examine motion 
picture films and to issue licenses based on whether films were 
“sacrilegious” was invalid as an unconstitutional abridgment of 
free speech and of free press. The law challenged in this case 
directly regulated the revenue-producing expression (in the form 
of movies) of the business plaintiff, a for-profit film company. 
Contrast these cases with the POM Wonderful case discussed 
above, or another recent business victory—that of Western States 
Medical Center et al. against provisions of the federal Food and 
Drug Administration Modernization Act in 2002.114 In Western 
States, the statute and regulations challenged did not regulate the 
sale of the underlying drugs being sold by the business party, but 
instead regulated the advertising and promotion of drugs. The 
companies involved were not set up to engage in speech or other 
forms of expression, but were using expression as an instrument, 
to further the primary goals for which they were established, to 
produce, distribute and sell drugs. 
 
 111. 297 U.S. 233 (1936). 
 112. The Court in Grosjean adverts to this background when it notes that the “form 
in which the tax is imposed is in itself suspicious,” being based not on advertising or 
revenues but “the extent of the circulation of the publication, with the plain purpose of 
penalizing the publishers and curtailing the circulation of a selected group of newspapers.” 
297 U.S. at 251. 
 113. 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
 114. Thompson v. Western States Medical Center et al., 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
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The distinction between laws regulating expressive 
businesses and laws regulating expression by non-expressive 
businesses is an important one in understanding the patterns in 
and social effects of post-World War II First Amendment 
doctrine. Expressive business cases—those involving film 
companies,115 newspapers,116 magazines,117 book publishers,118 
radio stations,119 theatre companies,120 and similar businesses—
often have fact patterns that are nearly identical to those involving 
individuals, with the only difference being the nature of the party. 
Individuals, by contrast, much less commonly bring cases 
involving expression of commercial speech, even though there are 
more sole proprietorships doing business in the U.S. than 
corporate businesses, and the sole proprietorships are equally 
subject to most business regulation.121 More importantly, 
expressive businesses brought all of the business victories under 
the First Amendment prior to Virginia Pharmacy. No non-
expressive business – which is to say, no business not engaged in 
expression for its primary revenue-producing activity—was able 
to achieve an offensive First Amendment case prior to 1976. Put 
differently, the era in which businesses have used the First 
Amendment to achieve de- or re-regulatory goals beyond their 
core revenue-producing activities falls entirely in, with increasing 
frequency during, the last thirty years since the First 
Amendment’s adoption in 1791. 
 
 115. Burstyn, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
 116. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan et al., 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This case also included 
as petitioners the individuals who had taken out the ad claimed to be libelous, but it is 
coded for present purposes as a “business” case because of the role of the newspaper itself. 
Grosjean, 297 U.S. 233 (1936), an earlier First Amendment case involving newspaper 
companies, predates the sample. 
 117. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).  
 118. Bantam Books, Inc. et al. v. Sullivan et al., 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
 119. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
 120. Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968). 
 121. Commercial speech cases brought by individuals commonly involve 
professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, all generally banned from using the 
corporate form. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) 
(mandatory disclosures in attorney advertising); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447 
(1978) (attorney advertising restrictions); King v. New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216 (3rd Cir.) 
(2014) (professional counselors barred from seeking to change sexual orientation); 
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (ban on in-person solicitation by certified public 
accountants); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (ban on use of trade names by 
optometrists). 
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iii. Limits and Implications of Supreme Court Evidence 
The analysis so far has limits. Because the dataset is 
composed solely of Supreme Court cases, it runs up against 
censoring or selection problems for both case type and outcome 
data. These include the fact that the Supreme Court’s docket is 
largely discretionary and small relative to the universe of disputes, 
creating a challenge for interpreting data on both case type 
incidence and case outcomes. For data on case type incidence, the 
Court’s docket over time may not reflect the importance of legal 
doctrines over time, if a doctrine had reasonably predicable 
implications for disputes if litigated. For data on case outcomes, 
the empirical challenge was flagged long ago context by Priest and 
Klein122—one should expect to see “win” rates for a given class of 
cases near 50%, if litigants were rational and equally informed 
and incentivized, because they would tend to settle as the odds of 
victory moved away from 50%.123 Indeed, this is what we see for 
the period after Virginia Pharmacy, where win rates for both 
businesses and individuals are 55%, close enough to 50% given 
the variance in the data to be consistent with the Priest-Klein 
hypothesis. 
What is empirically interesting is that there were enough 
cases prior to Virginia Pharmacy in which businesses sought to use 
the First Amendment, the Supreme Court took the case, but 
where the Court declined to intervene, such that the win rate for 
business was quite low, over a sustained period.124 One such case 
was Citizen Publishing Co.,125 where two businesses attempted to 
 
 122. George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
 123. Cf. Jeff Yates, Damon M. Cann, & Brent D. Boyea, Judicial Ideology and the 
Selection of Disputes for U.S. Supreme Court Adjudication, 10 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 847 
(2013) (finding that about 56% of First Amendment cases favor the liberal party, and that 
partisan ideology of Supreme Court Justices in First Amendment cases is strongest in cases 
where deviation of case outcomes from 50% exceeds 5%).  
 124. These imply that the Priest-Klein hypothesis—which assumes equal incentives 
for parties to pursue cases to a litigated decision (and here, through the difficult appeal up 
to the Supreme Court)—may not always hold in the business context, where the profit 
motive and large corporate resources may dramatically shift the willingness and ability of 
businesses to pursue litigation beyond that a party-blind analysis would suggest would be 
rational in a narrowly framed analysis of a single case. (Individuals may be strongly 
motivated by both profit and ideology, but typically have fewer resources than business 
corporations.) Indeed, one can rightly conceive of Virginia Pharmacy and Central 
Hudson—and all of their progeny—as reflecting that same set of unusual incentives, in 
which businesses have far more to gain from a sustained and programmatic effort to shift 
First Amendment doctrine in their favor than a narrow cost-benefit analysis of any one 
case would be true for an individual or less well-resourced and motivated litigant. 
 125. Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1970). 
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argue that the Sherman and Clayton Acts were in conflict with the 
First Amendment because they prohibited the use of joint 
operating agreements between a city’s only two newspapers. 
Quoting and affirming the 1945 case of Associated Press,126 the 
Court held that: 
It would strange indeed . . . if the grave concern for freedom of 
the press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment 
should be read as a command that the government was without 
power to protect that freedom. 
This wisdom seems to have fallen out of the current Court’s 
jurisprudence, in the same way that the guaranty of a Republican 
form of government contained in Article IV of the U.S. 
Constitution127 has faded from the public memory. Another failed 
business effort to use the First Amendment against laws and 
regulations from the pre-1976 era was California v. LaRue, in 
which the Court upheld regulations of liquor licenses and dancers 
at licensed bars, on the ground that it was not “irrational or 
unreasonable” for a state to pass laws providing that the “sale of 
liquor by the drink and lewd or naked entertainment should not 
take place simultaneously.”128 Ongoing efforts by society to 
confront the causes and consequences of violence against women 
make what might have for a time seemed old-fashioned prudery 
seem more reasonable than once was the case.129 Another 
example of a failed business effort to use the First Amendment to 
strike down regulation was Pittsburgh Press, in which the Court 
 
 126. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
 127. That clause reads “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union 
a Republican Form of Government.” Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849), is generally 
thought to have—under the political question doctrine—essentially eliminated Article IV, 
Section 4, Clause 1 from operative U.S. law. A neutral observer might wonder at the U.S. 
Supreme Court essentially inventing ever-widening First Amendment grounds for 
intervening in political questions, while refusing to consider a part of the U.S. Constitution 
on the basis of a pre-Civil War case that was essentially repudiated by the addition of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, even when the neglected part of the 
Constitution directly bears on modern decisions, including campaign finance cases such as 
Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. et al. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. at 2490 (2012) (overturning a 
Montana ban on direct corporate political expenditures out of general treasury funds).  
 128. 409 U.S. 109 (1973). 
 129. Interestingly, the Court has “disavowed” the reasoning in LaRue, but not the 
holding, focusing instead on the LaRue opinion’s mistaken reliance on the Twenty-First 
Amendment as giving states more power to regulate alcohol consumption in derogation of 
other Constitutional rights, 44 Liquormart, Inc. et al. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), 
even as the Court in the same case built on Virginia Pharmacy to extend it to bans on 
advertising alcohol prices.  
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upheld a municipal ordinance banning newspapers from carrying 
sex-based job advertisements.130 
B. THE ROLE OVER TIME OF CENTRAL HUDSON IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEAL 
To address one limit of the foregoing analysis, this section 
analyzes a different set of cases—those in the federal Courts of 
Appeal. Unlike the Supreme Court, those courts do not have 
substantial discretion over their docket, eliminating one source of 
potential selection bias over the cases reported. (The other 
source—litigant anticipation of case outcomes—remains, but 
should not strongly affect incidence of mandatory appeals, which 
is what is here analyzed.) The data for this section consists of all 
cases decided in the Courts of Appeals found in Westlaw citing 
Central Hudson, the leading case establishing the “commercial 
speech” doctrine. After eliminating duplicates, the dataset 
consists of 414 decisions, with some found in each of the Circuits: 
from 21 in the Eighth Circuit and 25 in the D.C. Circuit to 77 in 
the Ninth Circuit and 80 in the First Circuit. 
The time trend revealed in the data is fairly straightforward: 
it is up. A simple regression of cases on year of decision shows 
that Central Hudson is being cited 0.21 more times every year, on 
average, since 1980, and the time trend alone explains 31% of the 
variation in case cites. The peak in the sample was 2012, when 20 
decisions cited Central Hudson. The most recent year, 2014, saw 
15 such decisions. The time trend is not perfectly linear—as shown 
in Table 1, there are some fluctuations, with a decline in the early 
‘90s, and another in the early ‘00s. But the overall trend is clearly 
up, and not driven by any particular spike towards the end of the 
period. In each of the fifteen years in the second half of the 
sample, the number of cases citing Central Hudson exceeded the 
average (nine) for the first half, and the average for the second 
half was 44% higher (fourteen) than for the first half. 
Consistent with the Supreme Court data presented below, 
the growing role of Central Hudson in the Courts of Appeal 
supports the view that businesses are growing steadily more 





 130. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).  
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One concern about interpreting the above data as showing a trend 
towards more use of the First Amendment by businesses is that 
one could imagine that Central Hudson—simply by articulating a 
new test—stimulated more cases in which plaintiffs and lower 
courts cited it, but without having much impact on the application 
of the First Amendment to business regulation. The above 
analysis partly rejects this idea—given that no case prior to 
Virginia Pharmacy had struck down laws under the First 
Amendment on behalf of non-expressive businesses. But one 
might ask how the patterns of post-Central Hudson Courts of 
Appeals citations compare to other novel, landmark cases under 
the Bill of Rights. To consider this, a similar time-series was 
constructed of Courts of Appeals cases citing (1) Mapp v. Ohio,131 
which first articulated the exclusionary rule permitting evidence 
in violation of Fourth Amendment rights to be barred from 
criminal trials, and (2) Roe v. Wade,132 which first articulated a 
right to abortion. Each of those cases articulated a new ground for 
bringing federal cases. The results of that analysis are presented 
in Figure 3. 
 
 131. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 132. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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As can be seen, the pattern of Courts of Appeals cases citing 
Mapp spike in the half-dozen years afterwards, and then fall off 
significantly, before leveling off at a relatively low level, with an 
overall trend line sloping down over the period since the decision. 
Cases following Roe are similar, with an even steeper decline over 
the entire time since the decision, and no durable resurgence in 
the 1990s and 2000s. The case pattern for Central Hudson is 
distinct. Instead of falling off, the numbers of Courts of Appeal 
cases have increased since 1980, with some annual ups and downs, 
but a clear overall trend upwards. Compared to Mapp and Roe, 
Central Hudson created a sufficiently malleable tool for litigants 
that they have continued to generate ever more contested cases at 
the appellate court level over time. Of course, these numbers do 
not tell us anything about the nature of the cases, so it possible 
that the increase in cases under Central Hudson is not 
substantively meaningful, and does not reflect successful 
challenges to regulations by businesses. To assess the decision’s 
substantive impact, we need to examine the specifics of a sample 
of current business cases under the First Amendment. 
C. THE CURRENT ROLE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE 
COURTS OF APPEAL 
To better understand the cross-section of current commercial 
speech cases, each of the decisions citing Central Hudson decided 
in 2014 was reviewed to identify the nature of the litigants, theory 
of the case, and case outcome. Table 2 summarizes. 
 
Table 2 (Federal Courts of Appeals Cases Citing Central Hudson in 2014) 





Safelite Group, Inc. v. 
Jepsen 
764 F.3d 258 (2nd 
Cir.) 
Business Government Business win 
 
King v. New Jersey 767 F.3d 216 (3rd 
Cir.) 
Individual Government Individual 
loss 
Heffner v. Murphy 745 F.3d 56 (3rd 
Cir.) 
Business Government Business win 
1-800-411-Pain 
Referral Serv., LLC 
v. Otto 
744 F.3d 1045 (8th 
Cir.) 
Business Government Business loss 
Dwyer v. Cappell 762 F.3d 275 (3rd 
Cir.) 
Business Government Business win 
Liberty Coins, LLC v. 
Goodan 
748 F.3d 682 (6th 
Cir.) 
Business Government Business loss 
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Hucul Adver., LLC v. 
Charter Twp. of 
Gaines 
748 F.3d 273 (6th 
Cir.) 
Business Government Business loss 
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. 
v. Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n 
748 F.3d 359 (D.C. 
Cir.), vac. in 
rehearing en banc 
2014 WL 2619836 
Business Government Business win 
Am. Meat Inst. v. 
U.S. Dept. of Agric. 
746 F.3d 1065 (D.C. 
Cir.), vac. in 
rehearing en banc 
2014 WL 2619836 
Business Government Business loss 
Van Wagner Boston, 
LLC v. Davey 
770 F.3d 33 (1st 
Cir.) 
Business Government Business win 
Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. 
v. City of New York 
740 F.3d 233 (2nd 
Cir.) 
Individual Government Individual 
win 
Tyler v. Hillsdale Co. 
Sheriff’s Dept.  
775 F.3d 308 (6th 
Cir.) 
Individual Government Individual 
win 
Jordan v. Jewel Food 
Stores, Inc. 
743 F.3d 509 (7th 
Cir.) 
Individual Business Business loss 
Wollschlaeger v. 
Florida 
760 F.3d 1195 (11th 
Cir.) 




Business achieved a 50% win-rate (five of ten) in these 
cases.133 Consistent with the analysis above, most of these cases 
are not brought by expressive businesses—not newspaper 
companies or book publishers or the like—but by a range of 
ordinary corporations, in a range of ordinary businesses, 
challenging a range of ordinary regulations not targeted at speech 
generally, but either requiring disclosures or regulating specific 
speech acts (such as the content of sales pitches, trade names, and 
radio ads) that were incidental to the businesses in question. In 
Safelite Group, the plaintiff was a insurance claim manager, 
unhappy about an anti-tying not allowing the business to 
contractually require insureds to use, or steer them towards, an 
 
 133. The fact that business is over-represented in these cases relative to the Supreme 
Court cases above is not surprising, since these cases are all citing Central Hudson, which 
articulated the commercial speech doctrine. In King, that doctrine was extended to 
individual professionals seeking to speak in their professional capacities, but the individual 
plaintiff involved lost despite the application of the doctrine. In Tyler and Wollschlaeger, 
the case was cited by analogy, and not applied to the facts of the case. In Jordan, the 
business asserted the doctrine as a defense to a series of claims brought by Michael Jordan. 
In Evergreen Ass’n, the government defendant attempted to argue that the case was a 
commercial speech case, and lost that argument.  
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affiliated service company;134 in Heffner, plaintiffs included 
funeral services companies, who wanted to be able to operate 
under trade names that did not include the name of a current or 
former funeral director;135 in Otto, it was a medical services 
referral provider seeking to use actors in TV ads purporting to 
depict former customers and to claim in radio spots that injured 
victims “may be entitled to up to forty thousand dollars.”136 In 
American Meat and National Association of Manufacturers, the 
plaintiffs were industrial company trade groups hoping to avoid 
“country-of-origin” labeling requirements137 and disclosure 
requirements concerning their purchase of “conflict minerals,”138 
respectively. The only expressive business-plaintiff in these cases 
was Van Wagner Boston, LLC, an outdoor advertising company. 
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS: 
CORPORATIONS, INDIVIDUALS, AND OWNERSHIP 
The foregoing historical empirical analyses found that (a) the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment docket did not include 
business plaintiffs at all until roughly 150 years after the First 
Amendment was adopted, and long after business had produced 
the giant gains in wealth and welfare that have made capitalism 
the dominant form of economic activity in the world; (b) until the 
mid-1970s, only expressive businesses challenging laws that 
directly impeded their core business were able to convince the 
Court to strike down laws on their behalf, and not other 
businesses seeking to achieve de- or re-regulatory goals generally; 
(c) after the burst of judicial activism under the influence of 
Justice Powell in the mid-1970s, First Amendment cases in which 
businesses are the primary beneficiary have increasingly displaced 
cases in which individuals are the primary beneficiary; (d) the 
Central Hudson doctrine has encouraged an increasing number of 
commercial speech cases to be brought over time, and, in line with 
the Priest-Klein hypothesis, the private litigants are generally 
making accurate predictions in their case selection, leading to 
business wins in about 50% of the cases appealed to the Courts of 
Appeal; and (e) cases currently being decided in the Courts of 
Appeal under Central Hudson mostly do not involve expressive 
businesses, but are attacks on laws and regulations that inhibit 
 
 134. 764 F.3d 258, at 259–61. 
 135. 745 F.3d at 88–89. 
 136. 744 F.3d at 1051–53. 
 137. 746 F.3d at 1065–66. 
 138. 748 F.3d at 363–65. 
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“speech” by other kinds of businesses in areas of activity 
incidental or instrumental to their core profit-making activity. 
These findings present a challenge to the view, articulated by 
the majority and concurrences in Citizens United and Hobby 
Lobby, that corporations and other business entities should be 
understood “simply” as aggregations or associations of 
individuals, and so should not be distinguished from them for 
purposes of First Amendment analysis. It is true that corporations 
are given life and meaning only because of individuals, but the 
identities, roles and powers of individuals associated with 
corporations vary enormously. As a result, the influence of 
different individuals associated with corporations on the legal 
decisions of those corporations, and the effects of those decisions 
on individuals associated with corporations, also varies 
enormously, across types of corporations. 
At one extreme, a single-owner corporation with no 
employees is nothing more than a form of property for that one 
individual. The individual does not typically need the corporation 
to pursue the individual’s interests in free expression—they can 
do so directly. Even if the corporation so owned has property 
needed to defend constitutional rights, that property can be 
removed easily from the corporation and used by the individual. 
For the millions of sole proprietorships organized for legal 
purposes in this way, there is simply no legitimate need (albeit 
little harm) in granting First Amendment rights to such entities. 
At the other extreme, a multiple-owner corporation with 
thousands of employees may be viewed as the association of the 
owners, of the employees, or both. In typical, large, publicly held 
U.S. companies, the ones with the most money and resources, it is 
neither owners nor employees that are legally empowered to act 
on behalf of the company, or to choose its business strategies or 
litigation tactics. The individuals with that power comprise the 
board of directors, typically fewer than fifteen in number, 
nominally elected by the shareholders, but in fact largely self-
perpetuating. In fact, even the board rarely chooses business 
strategy and almost never chooses litigation tactics in practice, but 
delegates those tasks to a small number of senior managers, 
subject only to loose oversight, consisting of six to twelve board 
meetings per year, at which the information the board has is 
largely produced by the managers they oversee. 
However one evaluates these facts, they are facts, with 
implications for how to think about the corporate takeover of the 
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First Amendment. While any corporate challenge to a law or 
regulation under the First Amendment necessarily involves some 
human individual, that individual is not necessarily one with 
legitimate authority or social interests in the strategy or tactics 
involved in the challenge. For example, at the time that IMS 
Health Inc. initiated the lawsuit that led to the Sorrell139 decision 
in 2011, it was a publicly traded company, with thousands of 
shareholders, and thousands of employees.140 No individual 
owned more than 3% of its shares – indeed, all of its directors and 
officers combined owned less than 3% of its shares.141 It had four 
institutional shareholders with more than 5% of its shares, each, 
but each of those institutions held on behalf of thousands of 
individual beneficiaries.142 
As a result, the decision to sue the Vermont Attorney 
General to strike down the privacy laws attacked in that case was 
not made by (or with the consent or even knowledge) of any of 
those employees or owners, other than (possibly) the senior 
management and (likely) a relatively small number of employees 
in the business unit interested in exploiting customer data and in 
the legal department. The bulk of the owners, and in all likelihood 
most of the employees, were not asked or informed about 
whether they or IMS Healthcare, Inc. had a meaningful First 
Amendment interest in “speaking” about the prescribing 
practices of individual doctors based on private patient data that 
the company had obtained. In fact, the majority of owners or 
employees living in Vermont had an interest in the prevention of 
“speech” of that kind, assuming ordinary assumptions about 
representative democracy reflecting the “median voter” were 
valid. Nor in fact did any individual have such an interest—the 
individuals in the relevant business unit and the individuals 
 
 139. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 140. IMS Health Incorporated, Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 10, 22, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar
/data/1058083/000104746910000961/a2196431z10-k.htm (disclosing over 7,000 employees 
and over 3,000 record holders). Record holders include brokers and banks that typically 
hold on behalf of more numerous beneficial owners, which in turn may be institutions (for 
example, mutual funds) that hold on behalf of still more numerous individuals. John C. 
Coates IV, The Powerful and Pervasive Effect of Ownership on M&A (Harvard Law and 
Economics Discussion Paper No. 669, June 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1544500. 
 141. IMS Health Inc. 2010 Proxy Statement at 5-7, available at http://tinyurl.com
/osegjb6. 
 142. Id. (listing Barclays, Arial Capital, FMR, and Wellington as block holders). Each 
of those institutions is a well-known money management firm investing money on behalf 
of their own investor-clients.  
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managing the corporation only had an interest in earning a profit 
in the least regulated way possible, and the company’s interests in 
“expression” (of private prescribing practice data!) were 
instrumental and linked to their individual interests only through 
their profit motive. 
In sum, the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sorrell—as in most of the First Amendment business cases since 
Virginia Pharmacy—was not to vindicate the expressive interests 
of any individual associated with IMS Health Inc., but simply to 
make it easier for that company, as a business organization, to 
make money, at the expense of the privacy of Vermont residents. 
The result was, in essence, to transfer power to set regulatory 
policy from the Vermont government to the Court. The transfer 
was achieved at the behest of a small group of individuals, 
managers and employees of a single company. These managers 
and employees were never asked or expected by the organizers or 
owners of the company to use that power in such a fashion. Put 
differently, the corporate takeover of the First Amendment 
represents a pure redistribution of power over law with no 
efficiency gain – “rent seeking” in economic jargon. That power 
is taken from ordinary individuals with identities and interests as 
voters, owners and employees, and transferred to corporate 
bureaucrats pursuing narrowly framed goals with other people’s 
money. This is as radical a break from Anglo-American business 
and legal traditions as one could find in U.S. history. 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TAKEOVER 
TO THE NEW CORRUPTION 
In this final Part III, I cash out the historical and empirical 
analysis in Parts I and II by sketching the consequences of the 
corporate takeover of the First Amendment. I first try to define 
what is at stake—a specific form of legal corruption that is distinct 
but has analogues to forms of corruption that can be found in 
history. I then argue that the corruption represented by the 
ongoing corporate takeover of the First Amendment, if it persists, 
not only risks the loss of a republican form of government 
emphasized by most critics of Citizens United, but the risk of an 
extended era of economic malaise—a package of risks that one 
might call (with only some exaggeration) “the risk of Russia.” 
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A. WHAT IS CORRUPTION? 
Definitions of “corruption” vary. Corruption is a “derivative 
concept,” one that needs to be linked to both a specific noun 
(institution, person, object) and a normative theory of how that 
noun ought to be, against which corruption can be measured.143 
Corruption is the negative of health. For complex systems such as 
democracy and capitalism, ill health can arise from a wide number 
of causes. It follows that—for an institution or a system—efforts 
to improve health—to combat corruption—can take a wide 
number of forms. 
In ordinary conversation, multiplicity of meanings may lead 
to confusion but also to discussion and clarification. But legal 
concepts in operation need to be more specific and simple—else 
they are difficult to predict and apply, and at the margin, 
meaningless and manipulable. This was one arguably legitimate 
reason that in Citizens United, the Supreme Court overturned its 
precedents and narrowed the legal meaning of corruption to 
consist solely of “quid pro quo” corruption—i.e., bribery of 
government officials—the exchange of something of value for a 
specific governmental act.144 As a result of the Court’s narrow 
definition, campaign finance laws that have the purpose of 
reducing corruption understood more broadly are, in the Court 
majority’s view, unjustified, and so fail under the First 
Amendment, even if evaluated under the nominally lighter 
“commercial speech” doctrine, which as noted above, requires a 
“substantial purpose” to be served “directly” by laws abridging 
such speech.145 
The Court’s narrowing is not the only way to give the concept 
of corruption enough specificity to have legal meaning, as 
 
 143. Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1385 (2013). Others have made similar points. See, e.g., Dennis F. 
Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1038 (2005) (“The form the virus [corruption] takes depends on the 
form of government it attacks. In regimes of a more popular cast, such as republics and 
democracies…[t]he essence of corruption…is the pollution of the public by the private.”); 
Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 373 (2009) 
(“Corruption . . . has two meanings . . . . It has a broad meaning, describing all kinds of 
moral decay, and a more specific meaning in the context of politics.”); Samuel Issacharoff, 
On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 126 (2010) (“Any constitutional test 
resting on corruption as the evil to be avoided begs for a definition of the good, or, in this 
case, the uncorrupted.”). 
 144. 130 S. Ct. at 908–11; Heather Gerken, Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, 
27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155, 1157–58 (2011) (Citizens United “substantially narrowed the 
definition of corruption”). 
 145. See text accompanying supra notes 85–93. 
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illustrated by the Court’s own analysis. “The fact that speakers 
may have influence over or access to elected officials,” Justice 
Kennedy wrote, “does not mean that these officials are corrupt,” 
and “[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption.”146 In one of 
the more astonishing sections of any Supreme Court opinion ever 
written, Kennedy acknowledges: 
If elected officials succumb to improper influences from 
independent expenditures; if they surrender their best 
judgment; and if they put expediency before principle, then 
surely there is cause for concern. 
From this sensible sentence, he reverts to catechism: “it is our 
law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the governing 
rule,” and “bans on speech that are asymmetrical to preventing 
quid pro quo corruption” are unconstitutional. In sum, to 
Kennedy and the Court majority, corruption as a legal concept 
excludes “influence,” “ingratiation,” and even “improper 
influences.”147 Excluding these moderately broader conceptions of 
corruption from its legal meaning was not necessary to limit the 
potential reach of laws justified by corruption. One is put in mind 
of Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty when he said, “in a rather 
scornful tone” that “‘When I use a word . . . it means just what I 
choose it to mean — neither more nor less.’”148 
Commentators have criticized the Court’s radically narrowed 
definition as too narrow, and have offered their own, broader 
definitions. Zephyr Teachout draws on the ideological history of 
early U.S. history to argue that corruption, as understood at that 
time, involved “excessive private interests influencing the exercise 
of public power.”149 Larry Lessig argues that the best conception 
of corruption is a type of dependency of an agent or institution on 
some one or group other than the principal or intended 
beneficiary of the institution, such that the effectiveness of the 
agent or institution is impaired.150 Richard Hasen advances “rent-
seeking” as a new and broader understanding of corruption that 
 
 146. 130 S. Ct. at 908–11 (emphasis added). 
 147. Id. (emphasis added). 
 148. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND 
THERE 123 (Henry Altemus 1897) (1871). 
 149. ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 9, 38, 276 (2014). Teachout 
notes that corruption was cited more often in the U.S. Constitutional convention than 
“factions, violence, or instability,” that it was discussed on more than a quarter of the 
convention’s days, and that Madison recorded the use of the word 54 times. See Zephyr 
Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 352–53 (2009). 
 150. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS AND 
A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011). 
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could justify laws governing lobbying consistent with the First 
Amendment.151 Sam Issacharoff advances a conception of 
corruption in which “the threat to democratic governance may 
come from the emergence of a ‘clientelist’ relation between 
elected officials and those who seek to profit from relations to the 
state.”152 No doubt others could be advanced. 
Each of these definitions has appeal, and they obviously 
overlap. Each is consistent with a recent synthesis of research in 
political science on what stock market reactions to various events 
tell us about how corporations achieve political influence: “trust 
relationships are necessary to support potential corrupt practices 
and . . . cronyism based such relationships is a more prevalent 
practice than quid pro quo exchanges of money for political 
favors.”153 Each of these broader conceptions of corruption 
represents a vision of how to restore legal meaning to the 
legitimate goals of campaign finance reform. 
B. THE RISK OF RUSSIA 
Here, however, I want to argue that the corporate takeover 
of the First Amendment is a large part of an emerging form of 
corruption not solely of American government, but also of an 
institution that has been at least as important to America’s 
history—its “free enterprise” system, consisting of free market 
capitalism constrained by law. Others have emphasized the way 
that corporate speech “trumps”154 based on the First Amendment 
risks corrupting the American political system,155 which is no 
doubt true. Instead, I want to emphasize that the existence and 
power of those same trumps can also and as importantly corrupt 
the economic system. If an economically healthy but politically 
 
 151. Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. 191 (2012). 
 152. Issacharoff, supra note 143, at 121. 
 153. Jeff Milyo, Corporate Influence and Political Corruption: Lessons from Stock 
Market Reactions to Political Events (University of Missouri Dept. of Economics, Working 
Paper, 2013), available at http://economics.missouri.edu/working-papers/2013/WP1323_
milyo.pdf.  
 154. A note on rhetoric: First Amendment legal entitlements are generally called 
“rights” when applied to individuals, but are more properly conceived as “trumps” when 
applied to businesses. Individuals assert the “right” to speak as an end in itself; businesses 
(other than expressive businesses) use equivalent legal entitlements as an instrumental 
means to another goal, that of profits or economic rents. For more on “rents,” see text 
accompanying notes 147-54 supra. 
 155. See Teachout, supra note 143; Lessig, supra note 150; Laurence H. Tribe, 
Dividing Citizens United: The Case v. the Controversy, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 491–92 
(2015). 
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closed system is bad, a country like Russia that combines both 
despotism and economic malaise is worse. Both are risks of the 
corporate takeover of the First Amendment. 
The corporate takeover of the First Amendment is at its 
heart the use by elite members of society of specific legal tools to 
degrade the rule of law.156 These tools are those sketched in 
operation in Part I.C and Part II: the increasing and broadening 
use by corporations of challenges under the First Amendment to 
laws and regulations generally, and especially and increasingly 
laws that do not constrain expressive businesses (such as media 
companies), but any communicative or expressive activity of any 
business, no matter how incidental to the purpose and goals of the 
business, and no matter how little any ordinary individual (even a 
shareholder or employee of the business) might care about the 
expression in question. Concentrated, moneyed interests, 
represented by those in control of the country’s largest business 
corporations, are increasingly able to turn law into a lottery, 
reducing law’s predictability, impairing property rights, and 
increasing the share of the economy devoted to rent-seeking 
rather than productive activity. 
Companies are increasingly able to persuade courts—not all 
of them, all of the time, but enough of them, enough of the time—
to exploit the “fit” requirement of the Central Hudson test to 
achieve de- or re-regulatory goals not obtainable through the 
political process, as corrupt as that is becoming. The result is not 
simply de- or re-regulation, moreover—not simply a New 
Lochnerism,157 though it is that, too. Rather, the result also 
 
 156. By “rule of law” I have in mind conventional understandings, such as that agreed-
upon by H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller, despite their disagreements on other points, in which 
laws are general, published, prospective, clear, understandable, free from contradictions, 
not changed too frequently, and congruent with authorized or official action. H.L.A. 
HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 347 (1983); LON L. FULLER THE 
MORALITY OF LAW 145 (1969); cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235 (1971) (“A 
legal system is a coercive order of public rules addressed to rational persons for the 
purpose of regulating their conduct and providing the framework for social cooperation.”), 
which, as Peggy Radin has shown, can be viewed as similar to if also substantively different 
from the Fuller/Hart definition, in Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 
69 B.U. L. REV. 781,787–88 (1989), with the essential test being whether a dictatorship 
could be viewed as adhering to the rule of law. 
 157. For others noting the similarity between the use of the First Amendment to 
achieve de- and re-regulatory goals and the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to do the 
same in the Lochner era, see, for example, Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of 
Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583 (2008); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal 
Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 
(2015); Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2015). 
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undermines the rule of law more generally. Precedents are 
overturned;158 stare decisis becomes a joke;159 constitutional 
entrepreneurialism runs amok. Radicals in pinstriped suits rewrite 
whole elements of long-established legal order. Under First 
Amendment threat, laws become quantum objects—partly there, 
partly not there. As a system, they cease to have several of the key 
indicia of the “rule of law,” including consistency, predictability, 
and publicity.160 
Companies created to take business risks with enormous 
resources, derived from dispersed and hence rationally apathetic 
owners, increasingly place bets not on new technologies or 
marketing strategies, but on legal and political “innovation”—
what in business schools is taught under the Orwellian name 
“non-market strategies.”161 Consistent with the 1971 Powell 
memo,162 government affairs offices grow,163 and strategic planning 
generates decision trees down many branches of which a friendly 
panel of the D.C. Circuit overturns regulations, should an agency 
dare to enforce them.164 Agencies risk resources, demoralization, 
and loss of reputation and status when they lose these battles.165 
They trim their sails, and reduce their enforcement efforts. 
Knowing that they have a hard time enforcing the laws they have, 
agencies also reduce their regulatory activity,166 and ignore (or at 
 
 158. Virginia Pharmacy overturned Valentine; Bellotti was inconsistent with UAW-
CIO and Pipefitters; Citizens United overturned Austin and McConnell. 
 159. Adam Liptak, Thomas is Getting a New Chance to Break Precedent (if Not 
Silence), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2014, at A15 (“‘You are the justice who is most willing to re-
examine the court’s precedents,’ Judge Diane S. Sykes told [Justice Thomas] in November, 
at an annual dinner sponsored by the Federalist Society, the conservative legal group. 
Justice Thomas responded . . . ‘That’s because of my affinity for stare decisis,’ he said . . . 
Then he let out a guffaw.’”).  
 160. See supra note 144. 
 161. See, e.g., MGMT-450 Strategic Management in Non-market Environments, 
KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT (course overview describing course on “non-
market strategies” including use of “legislatures, regulatory bodies, or courts”), available 
at http://tinyurl.com/oht5cwv (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).  
 162. See supra note 82. 
 163. JOHN P. HEINZ, EDWARD O. LAUMANN, ROBERT L. NELSON & ROBERT 
SAINTSBURY, THE HOLLOW CORE (1993).  
 164. See, e.g., John M. de Figueiredo & Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr., The Allocation of 
Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulaton, 4 BUS. 
& POLITICS 161 (2002). 
 165. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, in 
THE NEW POLITICS OF PUBLIC POLICY 88 (MARC K. LANDY & MARTIN A. LEVIN EDS., 
1995) (explaining that litigation drains agency resources, causing agencies to alter their 
behavior in an effort to avoid it). 
 166. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case 
Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 1, 913–26 (2015) (describing delays and effects of 
litigation challenging securities regulations); Kagan, supra note 165; Bruce Kraus & 
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least impose long delays on implementing) directives from 
Congress. 
With the degradation of the rule of law come economic 
consequences. The rule of law—including stability in law and 
regulation—is essential to secure property rights, and 
“[e]conomists from Adam Smith (1776) to Douglas C. North 
(1981) agree that poor protection of property rights is bad for 
growth.”167 Efforts to use of the First Amendment by corporations 
to achieve non-expressive ends commonly represent what 
economists call “rent seeking,”168 or in more legal language, 
socially wasteful transfers, or in ordinary language, theft, waste 
and graft. When successful, rent seeking transfers wealth from 
one person to another, but more importantly, it represents a net 
wasteful investment in overall welfare, since one person’s gain is 
another’s loss, and the exercise of transferring wealth requires 
resources.169 
As with corruption, the concept of rent seeking has multiple 
potential meanings, and however defined is not a simple, uniform 
set of behaviors.170 Rent seeking can take different forms in 
different contexts, and flow in multiple directions. In classic public 
choice narratives, rent seeking is all about the use by government 
 
Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 YALE J. REG. 289, 
342 (2013) (“Cost-benefit litigation has substantially slowed the pace of financial 
reform.”).  
 167. Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Why Is Rent Seeking So 
Costly to Growth?, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers and Proceedings 409 (1993), available at 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/rent_seeking.pdf; see also Noel D. Johnson, 
Courtney L. LaFountain & Steve Yamarik, Corruption is Bad for Growth (Even in the 
United States), 147 PUB. CHOICE 377 (2011); Ignacio Del Rosal, The Empirical 
Measurement of Rent-Seeking Costs, 25.2 J. ECON. SURVEYS 298 (2011); Russell S. Sobel 
& Thomas A. Garrett, On the Measurement of Rent Seeking and Its Social Opportunity 
Cost, 112 PUB. CHOICE 115 (2002). 
 168. For a standard if ideologically tinged articulations of the concept of rent seeking, 
see Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 506, 506 
(Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) (“Rent seeking is the socially costly pursuit of wealth 
transfers.”). 
 169. As noted by Hasen, supra note 151 at n.232 (citing Charles Anderton, Teaching 
Arms-Race Concepts in Intermediate Microeconomics, 21 J. ECON. EDU. 148, 158–59 (1990) 
(“On occasion, lobbying activities to defeat earlier-imposed rent-seeking legislation could 
in isolation be efficient. For example, a lobbyist may successfully get the government to 
remove a protective tariff. Overall, however, a culture of fighting over transfers is likely to 
be inefficient, akin to the usual inefficiencies of arms races.”). 
 170. Paul Dragos Aligica and Vlad Tarko distinguish several types of rent-seeking 
societies in history before arguing that “crony capitalism” represents a new type of society. 
Crony Capitalism: Rent Seeking, Institutions and Ideology, 67 KYKLOS 156, 157 (2014) 
(“Crony capitalism is yet another type of rent-seeking society, distinct of those three, and 
that its key distinguishing feature is that the prevailing rent-seeking structure is legitimized 
by means of a populist ideology.”). 
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officials of power to award monopolies or bar entry to new 
businesses unless bribes are paid. In development economics, it 
often represents simple bribes for subsidies, grants, underpriced 
loans, or tax breaks. It can involve simple information advantages, 
which may permit insider trading or the equivalent in non-
securities markets. 
Less well appreciated is that rent seeking can also occur 
through the courts. It can represent bribes to judges to rule in 
favor of bribe-payers in disputes, or a flow of benefits—speaking 
fees, status-enhancing social invitations, non-monetary benefits 
such as free travel—in return for advancing a broad-scale legal 
ideology that will produce systematic benefits to the rent-seekers 
over time. Corporate managers can seek rents from the 
government to benefit their shareholders, government officials 
can seek to extract rents from corporations, and corporate 
managers can seek rents from shareholders, too (generally 
understood as a form of “agency costs” in the economic and law-
and-economics literatures), and use corporate political activity to 
advance their personal goals.171 
 
 171. For evidence on corporate political activity generally being associated with 
corporate agency costs, see Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Corporate Political Donations: 
Investment or Agency?, 14 BUSINESS AND POLITICS (2012) (explaining that political 
activity public companies spent less on R&D and political donations correlated negatively 
with long-term firm-specific stock performance); Coates, supra note 5 (stating that 
corporate political activity leads to higher incidence of corporate CEOs becoming high 
government officials, and is correlated with and partly results in lower corporate value); 
Holly Brasher & David Lowery, The Corporate Context of Lobbying Activity, 8 BUSINESS 
AND POLITICS (2006) (explaining that public companies, with dispersed owners, more 
likely to lobby than otherwise similar private companies, with concentrated owners); Paul 
K. Chaney, Mara Faccio & David Parsley, The Quality of Accounting Information in 
Politically Connected Firms, 51 J. ACC’T & ECON. 58 (2011) (finding that earnings quality 
of politically connected firms is significantly poorer than those not politically connected); 
Mara Faccio, Differences Between Politically Connected and Non-Connected Firms: A 
Cross-Country Analysis, 39 FIN. MGT. 905 (2010) (arguing that politically connected firms 
have higher leverage and market shares but underperform relative to non-connected 
firms); Mara Faccio, Ronald W. Masulis & John J. McConnell, Political Connections and 
Corporate Bailouts, 56 J. FIN. 2597 (2006) (discussing that politically connected firms and 
more likely to need and obtain bailouts and perform worse than non-connected companies, 
including those that also obtained bailouts); Michael Hadani & D. Schuler, In Search of El 
Dorado: The Elusive Financial Returns on Corporate Political Investments, 34 STR. MGT. 
J. 165 (2013) (political investments by public companies are negatively associated with 
market performance); Russell Sobel & Rachel Graefe-Anderson, The Relationship 
Between Political Connections and the Financial Performance of Industries and Firms, 
(George Mason University Mercatus Center, Working Paper No. 14-18, 2014), available at 
http://mercatus.org/publication/relationship-between-political-connections-and-financial-
performance-industries-firms (“We find little evidence to support the idea that political 
activity undertaken by corporations leads to improved performance for firms and their 
shareholders at both the industry and firm level. We do however find a robust and 
significant positive relationship between political activity and executive compensation.”); 
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As corporate activity becomes enmeshed in any or all of 
these types of rent seeking, they lose strategic focus on other, 
socially beneficial methods to make a profit: to innovate, to 
deliver goods and services efficiently, to pursue efficient cost-
cutting, to seek synergistic combinations of assets. Once corporate 
success depends on rent seeking, advancement within the 
corporation will depend on learning the levers of power in courts, 
legislators, and regulatory agencies, and different skills and forms 
of human capital will be rewarded. Rent seeking crowds out 
economically valuable activity, attracts investment and “talent,” 
and shapes careers.172 Businesses become increasingly aimed at 
exploiting market imperfections that conventional laws and 
regulations are meant to address. “An increase in rent seeking 
activity may make rent seeking more (rather than less) attractive 
relative to productive activity.”173 Real investment returns fall, 
faced with the risk of such exploitation. When, for example, 
consumers pay over $100 million per year for pomegranate juice, 
in substantial part because a company has convinced consumers 
that the juice reduces cholesterol, promotes a healthy heart and 
prostate, and slows tumor growth, when a government agency 
attempts to force the seller to prove the health claims in the same 
way that a drug company would have to do, only to have a court 
strike the requirement down under Central Hudson, the result is 
a waste of social resources, on multiple levels, with multiplier 
effects as others observe the result, and respond accordingly. 
At the end of the rent-seeking road is Russia, blessed with 
natural resources but neither democracy nor the rule of law nor 
sustained economic growth. I concede that Russia’s history is 
 
Frank Yu & Ziaoyun Yu, Corporate Lobbying and Fraud Detection, 46 J. FIN’L & QUANT. 
ANAL. 1865 (2011) (discussing that public firms engaged in lobbying and fraud are less 
likely than those not engaged in lobbying to be detected as fraudulent, and evade fraud 
detection for longer, allowing managers more time to sell shares and leading to greater 
misallocation of resources during fraudulent periods). 
 172. Others have advanced this point about campaign finance regulation. See e.g., 
Hasen, supra note 151; Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, 
and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1112–13, 1124–25 
(2002) (arguing that anti-rent-seeking was one of the goals of the Progressive-era 
restrictions on corporate political activity, noting that the corporate form “provides a 
simple way to channel rents to only those who have paid their dues, as it were. If you do 
not own stock, you do not benefit from the larger dividends or appreciation in the stock 
price caused by the passage of private interest legislation”); Edward Glaeser et al., The 
Injustice of Inequality, 50 J. MONETARY ECON. 199 (2003). To my knowledge, however, no 
one has connected the harms of rent-seeking to the broader corporate takeover of the First 
Amendment—which includes the campaign finance cases involving corporate activity, but 
extends to many other kinds of deregulatory uses of the First Amendment. 
 173. Murphy et al., supra note 167. 
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among its burdens, that the U.S. has robust republican traditions 
on which it can draw, and that the U.S. will not resemble Russia 
anytime in the near future. But it is precisely the force of history 
that creates worries about the path we are on, and whether it 
points towards anything like Russia. How far down that road we 
have already traveled is a good question. Some might argue that 
we have already moved some way down that road, pointing to the 
recent financial crisis and recession, which was caused in part by 
the deregulation of the financial industry over the past thirty 
years, including through litigation or threat of litigation. 
Pessimists might also suggest that the repeated non-compliance 
by the country’s largest banks with basic laws and regulations, the 
increased participation in party politics by trade groups and public 
companies, and the evident fact that the tax system has failed to 
accomplish the goal of fairly distributing the burdens of citizens 
based on its benefits. Pessimists might also note that in some 
models of the political economy, rent seeking can tip affairs from 
a healthy to an unhealthy equilibrium in a rapid fashion.174 More 
optimistic observers might argue that the rule of law tends to have 
an inertial power, and so to be resilient, and that the U.S. 
economy remains the strongest in the world, despite (or even 
because of) the past thirty years of legal change. Such judgments 
are contestable, unlikely to be resolved at such a high level of 
generality. The risks associated with a degraded rule of law, the 
risks of moving towards Russia, however, seem uncontestable. 
The risks of Russia are the risks that structural constraints on 
private corporate power—illustrated in the business history 
outlined at the outset of this Article—were meant to address. 
Heavy controls on corporate entities trying to move outside the 
business of business and into government activity date back to the 
Stuart period in England. The implementation of public finance 
was wrested away from the King by Parliament, a shift reflected 
in the U.S. in the vesting of the power to tax and spend in 
Congress. Monetary powers were hived off with the emergence of 
the Bank of England, eventually reflected in the U.S. in the 
Federal Reserve’s unique separation from private business and 
ordinary politics alike. A government monopoly over the creation 
and governance of multi-owner private legal entities was adopted 
in the Bubble Act, as eventually reflected in the U.S. in the 
effectively centralized powers in the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, with its authority over the New York Stock 
 
 174. See, e.g., id.  
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Exchange, and, with the characteristic quirkiness of American 
federalism, in the Delaware courts. Commerce and banking were 
separated, by custom in the U.K. and in the U.S. by law—the 
National Bank Act and the Bank Holding Company Act. 
Corporate economic power in the U.S. was further cabined by the 
Sherman Act, the Tillman Act, and the Hatch Act. Each of these 
structural constraints and controls emerged long before the 
Supreme Court invented an activist First Amendment 
jurisprudence, much less before that jurisprudence was extended 
to businesses or, still later, commercial speech. These structural 
constraints can best be understood as preserving room for free 
enterprise activity separate from the affairs of government—at 
securing the economic benefits of growth by insuring that “we are 
all servants of the laws, for the very purpose of being able to be 
[free].”175 Let us see that they survive the corporate takeover of 
the First Amendment. 
 
 175. THE ORATIONS OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO 164 (C.D. Yonge trans., 1867) 
 
